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UNRAVELING THE TAX TREATY 
Rebecca M. Kysar* 
 
Coordination among nations over the taxation of international transactions 
rests on a network of some 2,000 bilateral double tax treaties. The double tax treaty 
is, in many ways, the roots of the international system of taxation. That system, 
however, is in upheaval in the face of globalization, technological advances, 
taxpayer abuse, and shifting political tides. In the academic literature, however, 
scrutiny of tax treaties is largely confined to the albeit important question of 
whether tax treaties are beneficial for developing countries. Surprisingly little 
consideration has been paid to whether developed countries, like the United States, 
should continue to sign tax treaties with one another, and no formal revenue or 
economic analyses of the treaties has been undertaken by the United States 
government. In fact, little evidence or theory exists to support entrance into tax 
treaties by the United States, and examination of investment flows indicates the 
treaties likely lose significant U.S. revenues. Additionally, the treaties enable 
taxpayer abuse, stagnate domestic policy, and thwart reforms of the antiquated 
international tax system.  
Although tax treaties may have, at one time, served salutary purposes, 
modern circumstances call into question the relinquishment of taxing jurisdiction 
by source countries. I suggest that nations unravel the jurisdictional provisions 
from the treaties, abandoning or scaling them down, possibly through the new 
multilateral instrument. Rather than assessing antiquated notions of worldwide 
efficiency, the challenge for the international tax system going forward will be to 
attempt some degree of coordination while also imparting flexibility to advance 
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Coordination among nations over the taxation of international transactions 
rests on a network of some 2,000 bilateral double tax treaties. The double tax 
treaties are, in many ways, the roots of the international system. That system, 
however, is in upheaval in the face of globalization, technological advances, abuse 
by treaty beneficiaries, and shifting political tides. Yet serious examination of the 
worthiness of tax treaties is largely confined to the albeit important question of 
whether tax treaties are beneficial for developing countries. Surprisingly little to no 
consideration has been paid to whether developed countries should continue to sign 
tax treaties with one another. In fact, little evidence or theory exists to support 
entrance into a tax treaty by countries like the United States. And in many cases, 
tax treaties may be detrimental to their interests. The recent 2017 tax legislation 
makes these concerns even more pronounced.  
Although tax treaties may have, at one time, served salutary purposes, 
modern circumstances call into question their necessity. In short, tax treaties do not 
fulfill their purported objectives. Instead of alleviating double taxation, a dubious 
goal in and of itself for many reasons, the treaties are the means to achieve double 
non-taxation. This is because the tax treaties allocate taxing jurisdiction to the 
country of the taxpayer’s residence, which often fails to impose tax. Moreover, 
there is little evidence substantiating the claim that the treaties increase foreign 
direct investment. This is especially the case for a country like the United States, 
which does not benefit from the comity considerations that the treaty system 
imparts. Functions such as information exchange may provide benefits but can be 
achieved through standalone treaties that do not allocate taxing jurisdiction.  
Rather than meet their intended goals, tax treaties inflict harm. Although 
recent scholarship laments the revenue losses imposed by the treaty system on 
developing countries,1 even developed countries may lose revenue losses if they 
are net capital-importing. Although the United States was a capital exporter at the 
dawn of the treaty age, its role has since shifted. In fact, data that I have collected 
suggests the United States is currently losing a great deal of revenue through the 
treaty system. It perhaps seems surprising that these concerns have not been 
                                                 
1 Kim Brooks & Richard Krever, The Troubling Role of Tax Treaties, in TAX DESIGN ISSUES 
WORLDWIDE, SERIES ON INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 51 (Geerten M.M. Michielse & Victor 
Thuronyi eds., 2015); see, e.g., Allison Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-
Saharan Africa: A Case Study, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 639 (2005); John Avery Jones, Are Tax Treaties 
Necessary?, 53 TAX L. REV. 1, 2 (1999); Richard Vann, International Aspects of Income Taxation, 
in TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING (Victor Thuronyi ed., 1996); Alex Easson, Do We Still Need 
Tax Treaties?, 54 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 619 (2000); Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. 
J. INT’L L. & POL. 939 (2000); Lee Sheppard, How Can Vulnerable Countries Cope With Tax 
Avoidance?, 69 TAX NOTES INT’L 410 (2013). 
2 
 
explored by policymakers in the United States but, as this Article argues, is less so 
when one considers the limited process and political economy dynamics to which 
such treaties are subject.2  
Furthermore, the treaty system impedes fundamental reform of the 
international tax system. In the aftermath of recent tax legislation, many 
commentators have judged policies based on their compatibility with tax treaties.3 
I argue that such criticism is misplaced; tax reform will continue to be in tension 
with tax treaties precisely because the premise underlying the treaties has proven 
unworkable. Although some may condemn the unilateral steps taken by the United 
States and other countries to tax income at source, the harm that follows will likely 
prove to be minimal given domestic methods to alleviate “double taxation.”  
Moreover, incremental change that comes from the sovereign exercise of 
taxing power may spur a more rational approach to international taxation; one that 
is unlikely to occur from the top down due to the composition of various 
constituencies that comprise the current global tax players. This bottom-up 
rebuilding of the international tax regime is likely a necessary step on the way to 
true international tax reform. Although there will be a temporary disruption to the 
international tax order, and one which will certainly pose transition costs, such 
adjustments are inevitable in the transition to the modern global and digital 
economy. 
One way to ease the transition would be to employ an ordered mechanism 
to discard or scale down those treaty provisions that do the most harm—the ones 
that allocate taxing jurisdiction. One possible method is to leverage the new 
OECD’s multilateral instrument that is currently being used to add anti-avoidance 
principles, new residency safeguards, and other provisions to existing treaties. Just 
as the new multilateral instrument can be used to supplement the tax treaties, it can 
also be used to dismantle their most noxious aspects, while leaving the more useful, 
or at least less harmful, provisions in place. It could also be used to reduce 
unnecessary mismatches in tax systems, coordinating definitions of income, 
residency, and source, without forsaking taxing rights. Rather than assessing 
antiquated notions of worldwide efficiency, the challenge for the international tax 
system going forward will be to attempt some degree of coordination while also 
                                                 
2 The process by which tax treaties are enacted stands in stark contrast to trade agreements, which 
are subject to full consideration in the Senate and House. See Rebecca M. Kysar, On the 
Constitutionality of Tax Treaties, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2012).  
3 See H. David Rosenbloom and Fadi Shaheen, The BEAT and the Treaties (Aug. 21, 2018), 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3229532; Reuven Avi-Yonah & 
Bret Wells, The BEAT and Treaty Overrides: A Brief Response to Rosenbloom and Shaheen (Aug. 
17, 2018), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3232974. 
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giving credence to national interests in setting revenue policy.4 This solution aims 
to thread that needle. 
In Part I, this Article traces the history of the international tax and the 
bilateral tax treaty system up through the recent 2017 U.S. tax legislation. Part II 
explores the stated and unstated purposes of tax treaties, concluding that they 
ultimately fall short from the perspective of the United States. Part III examines 
harmful effects of the treaty regime, including revenue losses, loss of autonomy 
over revenue policy, the hindrance of tax reform, and tax avoidance. Part IV offers 
process and political economy reasons for why U.S. treaty policy seems so 
misaligned with the national interest. Part V looks at ways in which the new 
multilateral tax treaty can be utilized to shed the most harmful treaty provisions 
while retaining, and perhaps building, others.  
I. BACKGROUND OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX AND TREATY SYSTEM 
A. The Pre-Tax Treaty Era 
The primary predicament underlying international taxation is whether 
income should be taxed by the country in which the taxpayer resides (the “residence 
country”) or by the country where the income is earned (the “source country”).5  
International tax rules endeavor to resolve this dilemma by deciding which country 
gets to tax the income.  
Deferring to either the source or residence country alleviates double 
taxation; the difference is over which country gets the revenue.6 Typically, creditor, 
or capital-exporting, countries will favor residence-based taxation while debtor, or 
capital-importing countries, favor source-based taxation. For instance, assume that 
there are two countries, France and Great Britain. A French business borrows 
money from a bank in Great Britain, and the question becomes whether France, as 
the source country where the business is located and where the business income is 
generated, or Great Britain, as the residence country of the bank getting the interest, 
gets to tax the interest income. If a country is capital-exporting, like Great Britain 
in this example, it will prefer a residence-based approach because it will get the 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., TSILLY DAGAN, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY: BETWEEN COMPETITION AND 
COOPERATION 7 (2017) (arguing that the new international tax system must navigate between 
competition and cooperation); DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (2014) 
(questioning usefulness of notions of worldwide efficiency); Michael J. Graetz, Taxing 
International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policy, 54 
Tax L. Rev. 261 (2001) (same). 
5 Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The ‘Original Intent’ of U.S. International Taxation, 51 
Duke L. J. 1021, 1033 (1997). See, e.g., Ke Chin Wang, International Double Taxation of Income: 
Relief through International Agreement, 1921-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 73, 81-82 (1945). 
6 Adam H. Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside the (Tax) Treaty, WISC. L. REV. 740 (2012). 
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revenues. If a country is capital-importing, like France, then a source-based 
approach yields it greater tax dollars.  
The traditional historical account of international taxation emphasizes a 
1923 report for the League of Nations by four economists, led by Edwin Seligman, 
an economist at Columbia University.7 The 1923 Report rejected source-based 
taxation as resting upon a fallacy of the “benefits” theory of taxation--an exchange 
of government services for taxes. Instead, its drafters argued that ability to pay 
concerns support taxation by the residence country since it is that country that is 
able to ascertain the worldwide income of its residents, not the country of source. 
Additionally, the authors of the report had pragmatic concerns over identifying the 
country of source. Importantly, the four economists recognized that capital 
importing nations would not fare as well under the residence-based approach and 
therefore recommended that such division of taxing jurisdiction only made sense 
where countries had similar economies.8 
Several years later in 1928, the League of Nations drafted a model bilateral 
income tax treaty for the relief of double taxation, which was influenced by the 
1923 Report, as well as other precedents.9 The League of Nations treaty was quite 
generous to the residence country, allocating passive and portfolio income to that 
country. Although the source country had taxing jurisdiction over business income, 
such jurisdiction was limited to instances where the enterprise had a permanent 
establishment. Rates on passive income were also capped under the treaties, leaving 
residence countries with the ability to tax residual income.  
The League of Nations treaty rejected an earlier model treaty, which would 
have utilized a methodology to split profits between source and residence countries 
in accordance with criteria such as sales.10 In so doing, it catered to the mercantilist 
countries, who wished to tax more income as countries of residence rather than 
allocating income to where economic activity occurred.11 The rationale for this 
framework was premised on the “mercantilist belief that imperial countries were 
                                                 
7 Report on Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial Committee by Professors Bivens, Einaudi, 
Seligman, and Sir Josiah Stamp, League of Nations Doc. E.F.S.73 F.19, at 18 (1923) [hereinafter 
1923 Report]. 
8 Id.   
9 Graetz, supra note 5, at 1078 (emphasizing the report, along with other sources, such as the early 
U.S. international tax legislation and the work of the International Chamber of Commerce, as 
influencing the League of Nations treaty). 
10 Bret Wells & Cym H. Lowell, Income Tax Treaty Policy in the 21st Century: Residence v. Source, 
5 COL. J. TAX L. 1, 6 (2014).  
11 Id. at 34. As Wells & Lowell note, the discussion in the archives with regard to the political 
realities was “amazingly frank.” Id. The framers of the treaty all seemed to be aware that capital 
exporting nations were benefitting from the choice, at the expense of the colonized. 
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the source of capital and know-how while the colonies were passive suppliers of 
goods or services with little value-added functionality.”12  
 The 1928 model treaty served as the backbone of the tax treaty network, 
influencing the model income tax treaties of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations, and the United States. 
The international tax system evolved such that the default was source-based 
taxation with treaties as an elective, bilateral mechanism for countries to shift to 
residence-based taxation.13 Even today, the more than three thousand bilateral 
income tax treaties have a fundamental structure based on the League of Nations 
treaty.14 This residence-based approach to taxation has since been embraced by the 
Treasury Department numerous times15 and, more generally, through the United 
States’ adherence to the double income tax treaty system.16  
The world has obviously changed since the 1920s, with a massive growth 
in international capital flows, the creation of the global economy, and the rise of 
the multinational corporation. All of these developments increase the stakes at issue 
but also underscore that the foundations of the international tax system—the 
categories of source and residence—are inherently malleable concepts. 
Multinational corporations can avoid taxation by shifting capital income and IP to 
tax havens and by arbitraging differences in tax systems. The transfer pricing 
regime that attempts to stop profit shifting is premised on a legal fiction, dividing 
an economic firm into legal units from various countries, that thus far has proven 
unenforceable. Finally, competition for investment and capital has created 
aggressive tax competition, leaving many nations starved for revenue.17  
                                                 
12 Id. at 10.  
13 Rosenzweig, supra note 6, at  741-42. 
14 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for 
Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1996). The UN Model treaty gives more generous 
taxing rights to source countries, but it is fundamentally based on the OECD Model and its influence 
has been limited. Sergio Rocha, International Fiscal Imperialism and the ‘Principle’ of the 
Permanent Establishment, 64 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 83, 84 (2014).  
15 U.S. Treasury Dept., Selected Tax Policy Implications of Global Electronic Commerce, reprinted 
in BNA DAILY TAX REPORT L-8 (Nov. 22, 1996); DAVID F. BRADFORD, U.S. TREASURY TAX 
POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 89-90 (2d ed. 1984); see also THE 
PRESIDENT’S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY (May 
1985). 
16 To be sure, the origins of the international tax system are not neat and tidy. The foreign tax credit 
rules of the early international tax system, for instance, were swayed by a key Treasury advisor, T.S. 
Adams, who argued for the primacy of source-based rather than residence-based taxation. Graetz & 
O'Hear, supra note 5, at 1027. Although residence-based taxation has reigned supreme since the 
dawn of the tax treaty system, this is more of a departure from, rather than a continuation of, the 
original international tax rules of the United States. Id.  
17 Michael J. Graetz, Foreword—The 2017 Tax Cuts: How Polarized Politics Produced Precarious 
Policy, 128 YALE L.J. F. 315 (forthcoming 2018).  
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It thus is worth examining whether the approach to international tax 
embodied in the treaty system continues to be relevant. For decades, the 
international tax system was praised as “remarkably stable and successful”18 but 
few would conclude that this continues to be the case. 
B. Purposes and Features of Tax Treaties 
Tax treaties have stated and unstated purposes. First and foremost among 
the former, tax treaties are designed to eliminate double taxation.19 Double taxation 
occurs when more than one country lays claim to taxing an item of income. Tax 
treaties attempt to deal with double taxation by either (1) limiting source country 
taxation on investment income or business income that lacks a significant and 
continuous presence in the source country (the “permanent establishment” 
requirement), (2) requiring the residence country to provide an exemption of 
foreign source income or a tax credit for foreign taxes paid, or (3) coordinating the 
rules of both countries.20 Tax treaties further establish competent authority 
procedures, and more recently, binding arbitration, such that tax authorities commit 
to resolving issues of double taxation.21 
Another stated goal of tax treaties is to limit fiscal evasion. Treaties attempt 
to achieve this through information sharing provisions, which require tax 
authorities to disclose information to one another regarding taxpayers residing in 
one country who have tax obligations in the other country. These provisions 
override domestic confidentiality laws that bar governments from releasing tax 
                                                 
18 Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 5, at 1026; see also Avery Jones, supra note 1, at 2.  
19 Almost all tax treaties emphasize their purpose of avoiding double taxation by stating in the recital 
of the treaty the following: “Convention Between the United States of America and ___ for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on 
Income.” Philip F. Postlewaite & David S. Makarski, The A.L.I. Tax Treaty Study—A Critique and 
a Modest Proposal, 52 BULL. SEC. TAX’N 731, 734 n.2 (1999). The OECD Model Convention 
makes no explicit mention of avoiding double taxation, but did so until 1977. The preamble to the 
treaty was changed not to reject that purpose but to account for the fact that the treaty also addressed 
other concerns as well. INTRODUCTION TO OECD MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES 
ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL, Par. 16; Mitchell A. Kane, International Tax Reform, the Tragedy of 
the Commons, and Bilateral Tax Treaties 42 (draft on file with author).  
20 Rosenzweig, supra note 6, at 1231. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 
U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION art. 23 (2016) (hereinafter U.S. Model Treaty) (“[D]ouble 
taxation will be relieved as follows . . . In accordance with the provisions and subject to the 
limitations of the law of the United States (as it may be amended from time to time without changing 
the general principle hereof), the United States shall allow to a resident or citizen of the United 
States as a credit against the United States tax on income applicable to residents and citizens . . . the 
income tax paid or accrued to [the other treaty country] by or on behalf of such resident or citizen). 
21 Id. at art. 25. 
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information. This enables the residence country to more readily identify foreign 
source income of its residents.  
In recent years, tax treaties have been critiqued for focusing solely on 
double taxation rather than double non-taxation, which has plagued the 
international tax system in recent decades.22 In response to these concerns, there 
are efforts to revise the stated purposes of treaties. As a result of the OECD/G20’s 
project against base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS project), a new mechanism 
has been developed to update automatically existing tax treaties to conform to 
treaty-related minimum standards and to close gaps with existing rules. The 
mechanism to achieve these goals is a multilateral instrument, whereby countries 
choose which off–the-shelf updates they support.23 Through a novel matching 
process, if a country’s partners in existing tax treaties also choose a particular 
change, the treaty is automatically updated subject to domestic ratification 
procedures.  
The new instrument provides an option whereby treaty countries can adopt 
a preamble that commits to the elimination of double taxation “without creating 
opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or 
avoidance.”24 It implements this language through rules such as minimum 
standards limiting treaty shopping, a new anti-abuse standard, and rules against 
hybrid mismatches. 25 Treasury indicated that the United States did not sign the 
instrument, in part, because its U.S. domestic tax provisions, as well as its 
negotiating position for a number of years, already limit treaty shopping and abuse. 
Sixty-eight countries and jurisdictions have, however, signed on to the effort.26 
Finally, although the treaties themselves, as well as treaty commentaries, 
refer to the elimination of double taxation as their primary goal, some 
commentators have emphasized that modern tax treaties have focused primarily on 
the reduction of withholding taxes.27 Although addressing double taxation 
necessarily leads to a reduction in tax liability, the inverse is not true. Thus, tax 
treaties may simply reduce tax rates without addressing double taxation.28  
                                                 
22 This dynamic partially stems from tax competition, which distorts the allocation of capital and 
results in revenue losses worldwide. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and 
the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1576-78 (2000). 
23 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, MULTILATERAL 
CONVENTION TO IMPLEMENT TAX TREATY RELATED MEASURES TO PREVENT BASE EROSION AND 
PROFIT SHIFTING (2017). 
24 Id. at art. 6, par. 1. The multilateral instrument further provides that the participating countries 
can amend their treaties preamble to include a desire “to develop an economic relationship” between 
the treaty countries or “to enhance their co-operation in tax matters.” Id. at art. 6, par. 3.  
25 Id. at article 7.  
26 Kevin A. Bell, Five Things to Know About OECD’s Multilateral Instrument, BLOOMBERG (June 
16, 2017), https://www.bna.com/five-things-know-n73014453693/. 
27 Patrick Driessen, Is There a Tax Treaty Insularity Complex?, TAX NOTES 745, 748 (May 7, 2012). 
28 Id.  
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C. The Domestic Rules on International Taxation 
1. Worldwide v. Territorial  
Tax treaties lack operative provisions of law. Instead, they mostly function 
as jurisdictional overlays to the domestic rules of taxation, restricting a state’s claim 
to tax a certain item of income.29 Tax treaties limit the domestic rules by allocating 
the right to tax income to one treaty country or by requiring relief from double 
taxation. Importantly, a tax treaty does not create tax obligations, which are created 
by the operative domestic law. Additionally, under the “savings” clause of the 
treaties, the residence countries retain the right to tax worldwide income.30 Thus, 
the curtailment of source country jurisdiction only applies to foreign nationals, not 
to a resident of the contracting state.  
The domestic rules of international tax are as varied as the number of 
countries that employ them, but a few generalizations can be made. Commentators 
refer to two different types of international tax systems, worldwide and territorial. 
A worldwide system of taxation subjects foreign earnings to taxation, typically with 
relief of double taxation through a foreign tax credit. A territorial system of taxation 
exempts such earnings altogether. 
The majority of developed countries have shifted, in recent decades, 
towards territoriality. In reality, however, the distinction between territorial systems 
and worldwide systems is blurred, and the systems exist along a continuum.31 
Developed countries with territorial systems, for instance, have anti-profit shifting 
rules that tax certain types of highly mobile foreign income, which are presumed to 
be located offshore simply for tax reasons. These foreign systems could thus be 
more properly described as quasi-territorial. The United States’ international tax 
system, both new and old, also lies on a spectrum, as discussed below. 
2. The U.S. Rules—Pre- and Post- 2017 
Experts often referred to the former U.S. international tax system as 
worldwide since it subjected foreign earnings to U.S. taxation. However, the former 
system never fully taxed these earning. Taxation could be deferred, even 
indefinitely, by parking active income in foreign subsidiaries. In contrast, taxation 
could not be deferred on passive income, which was, and still is, taxed on a current 
                                                 
29 Rebecca M. Kysar, Interpreting Tax Treaties, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1387, 1411 (2016).  
30 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 20, at art 1(4).  
31 See Mark P. Keightley & Jeffrey M. Stupak, Corporate Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS): An Examination of the Data, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R44013, at 17 (2015) (discussing the 
futility of the worldwide and territorial labels); Daniel Shaviro, The New Non-Territorial U.S. 
International Tax System, TAX NOTES (July 17, 2018).  
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basis under the anti-deferral rules of subpart F and the passive foreign investment 
company regime. Additionally, the transfer pricing regime attempted to prevent 
companies from shifting too much income abroad to their foreign affiliates by 
charging non-arm’s length prices. These rules are notoriously ineffective, yet they 
continue to be relevant under the new system. 
Since the taxation of foreign source income by the United States might 
subject such income to double taxation, the United States has long offered a foreign 
tax credit for foreign taxes paid on such income. The credit was first enacted in 
1918,32 long before the United States’ entrance into its first tax treaty in 1932.33 
The effect of the credit is such that the United States collects residual taxation when 
its tax rate exceeds the foreign rate. When the foreign rate equals or exceeds the 
U.S. rate, U.S. tax liability is eliminated.34  
The new regime has been labeled a territorial system because the foreign 
income of foreign subsidiaries can escape taxation altogether through the new 
participation exemption provision so long as the domestic shareholder owns at least 
10% of the stock of the subsidiary.35 Here again, however, the territorial label fails 
since individuals, branches, and smaller shareholders are still subject to taxation on 
foreign income. Furthermore, there is a minimum tax regime, called the global 
intangible low tax income or GILTI regime, which subjects some foreign income 
of 10% corporate shareholders to a current 10.5% tax (and allows a foreign tax 
credit offset for 80% of foreign taxes paid).36 Lawmakers created these worldwide 
features since a move to pure exemption, as opposed to deferral, would have 
worsened incentives to shift income abroad.  
In addition to the participation exemption and minimum tax regimes, the 
2017 tax legislation also enacted two other notable reforms. In the foreign derived 
intangible income or FDII regime, Congress provided a special low rate on export 
income.37 Through the base erosion anti-abuse tax or BEAT regime, the legislation 
also bolstered source-based taxation by targeting profit stripping by U.S. firms 
making deductible payments to foreign affiliates. The BEAT subjects such 
payments to a minimum tax of 10%.38 Features of these new rules are in arguable 
tension with bilateral tax treaties, a point which will be treated more fully below.39  
 
                                                 
32 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919).  
33 See Herbert I. Lazerow, The United States-French Income Tax Convention, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 
649, n.1 (1971).  
34 Elisabeth A. Owens, United States Income Tax Treaties: Their Role in Relieving Double Taxation, 
17 Rutgers L. Rev. 428, 432 (1963). 
35 16 U.S.C. § 245A.  
36 26 U.S.C. §§ 250(a)(1); 951A; 960. 
37 26 U.S.C. § 250. 
38 26 U.S.C. § 59A. 
39 See supra notes [ ] and accompanying text.  
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II. THE PURPORTED PURPOSES OF TAX TREATIES 
 
As mentioned above, there are both stated and unstated purposes of tax 
treaties. The treaties themselves set forth double taxation relief and the prevention 
of fiscal evasion as their aims, yet commentators have hypothesized other 
motivations behind the treaties as well. This section explores how all of these goals 
go largely unfilled.  
A. Alleviation of Double Taxation 
1. Availability of Unilateral Relief 
The need to alleviate double taxation served as the impetus for the tax treaty 
regime. The conventional account is that, without tax treaties, multiple countries 
will lay claim to the same item of income.40 The predominant explanation for why 
we care about double taxation is that it “represents an unfair burden on existing 
investment and an arbitrary barrier to the free flow of international capital, goods, 
and persons.”41 
Tsilly Dagan has illustrated, however, that even without tax treaties, 
countries have incentives and mechanisms to alleviate double taxation 
unilaterally.42 Instead, Dagan argues that tax treaties serve “much less heroic 
goals,” such as easing administrative burdens and  harmonizing tax terminology.43 
More nefariously, Dagan contends tax treaties shift revenues from developing to 
developed countries.44 The IMF has agreed with Dagan’s view, noting that tax 
treaties based on the OECD model “significantly constrain the source country’s 
rights,” and cautions against developing countries entering into such treaties.45  
                                                 
40 Staff of Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Explanation of Proposed Protocol to the Income 
Tax Treaty Between the United States and Canada, 105th Cong. 4 (Comm. Print 1997) (“The 
traditional objectives of U.S. tax treaties have been the avoidance of international double taxation 
and the prevention of tax avoidance and evasion.”); COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, ORG. FOR ECON. 
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTRODUCTION TO MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND 
CAPITAL, para 15.2 (2017) (“[A] main objective of tax treaties is the avoidance of double taxation 
in order to reduce tax obstacles to cross-border service, trade, and investment”).  
41 H. David Rosenbloom & Stanley I. Langbein, United States Treaty Policy: An Overview, 19 
COLUM. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 359, 365-266 (1981).  
42 Dagan, supra note 1, at 941. 
43 Id. at 939.  
44 Id.  
45 International Monetary Fund, Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation, Policy Paper 12 
(May 9, 2014) (footnote omitted), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/050914.pdf; 
Mindy Herzfeld, The Case Against BEPS: Lessons for Tax Coordination, 21 FL. TAX REV. 1, 16-17 
(2017). Predating Dagan’s analysis by several decades were comments by Elisabeth Owens, who, 
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Using a game theory model, Dagan shows that because countries have 
incentives to alleviate double taxation unilaterally, a stable equilibrium of 
alleviation of double taxation would be achieved without tax treaties.46 These 
incentives derive from a country’s preferences to achieve a certain level of cross-
border investment. Dagan concludes that, under a variety of assumptions regarding 
those preferences, the outcome of unilateral policies is single rather than double 
taxation.47  
Dagan concludes tax treaties involve something other than elimination of 
double taxation. U.S. and global history lends support to Dagan’s conclusion since 
the United States enacted the foreign tax credit almost fifteen years before entering 
into tax treaties.48 Today, most countries include in their tax treaties the same 
mechanism for double tax relief that they provide outside of the tax treaty context.49  
Dagan instead posits that tax treaties exist to shift revenues from source 
countries, which are predominantly developing nations, to residence countries, 
which are predominantly developed nations. How precisely does this work? The 
lower the tax is in the source state, the higher the residual tax will be in the residence 
state. For instance, assume Country A, the residence state, taxes income at a 35% 
                                                 
focusing on the United States, argued that “tax treaties play a very marginal role in relieving double 
taxation” because “the U.S. has unilaterally provided for the avoidance of double taxation . . . 
through the foreign tax credit provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.” Owens, supra note 34, at 
430. More recently, commentators have reflected on the diminished role of tax treaties but without 
much elaboration or normative assessment. Dagan, supra note 1,at 8 (making this point); see, e.g., 
JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND 
FOREIGN INCOME 55:2 (2d ed. 1996) (“Tax treaties are principally concerned with the apportionment 
of tax revenues between the treasuries of the treaty countries....”); see also PAUL R. MCDANIEL & 
HUGH J. AULT, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 151 (1977) 
(concluding that double taxation is eliminated through unilateral measures and that tax treaties serve 
a more modest function of refining these measures to reflect the relationships of the two treaty 
countries); Julie A. Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with Disparate Tax Systems, 
81 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1767 (1995) (arguing that unilateral measures to reduce double taxation has 
lessened the need for taxpayers to rely on treaty provisions); Pierre Gravelle, Tax Treaties: 
Concepts, Objectives and Types, 42 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 522, 523 (1988) 
(adopting the view that tax treaties merely “refine[] and improve[]” the domestic mechanisms to 
alleviate double taxation). The ALI, in contrast, has concluded that “[t]here is remarkably broad and 
well-established consensus among governments of various political and economic persuasions that 
it is in their interest to enter into income tax treaties . . .” AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION II, 
PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES 5 (1992). Even the ALI, however, also 
admitted that many treaty goals can be achieved through domestic legislation, outside of the treaty 
process. Instead, countries modify their domestic laws only to derive reciprocal dispensations from 
the other country. Id. at 12-13. 
46 DAGAN, supra note 4, AT 7.  
47 Id. at 13-36. 
48 Steven Dean, Philosopher Kings and International Tax, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 944 (2007).  
49 DAGAN, supra note 4, at 37.  
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rate with a credit for foreign taxes paid. If a Country A resident earns $100 income 
in Country B, the source state, that is taxed at a 30% withholding rate, then Country 
B will receive $30 of tax revenue and Country A will receive only $5 of revenue. 
If instead a treaty lowers the Country B withholding tax to 15%, Country B will 
receive $15 of tax revenue, and Country A will receive $20 of revenue.50 
Why would Country B forgo its revenues? It aims to increase inbound 
foreign investment by lowering the tax burden on it. Additionally, because the 
benefits are reciprocal, it may receive more revenues with the treaty than without 
it, depending upon the balance of investment flows between the two countries.  
Thus, tax treaties would tend to make the most sense when countries are in 
relatively symmetrical positions regarding their investment flows into the other 
country. In such cases, the taxes the countries lose from their position of lowering 
taxes as a source country will be offset by the increased revenues they get to collect 
from their own residents in their capacity as a residence country. This is assuming 
that the other purported benefits of treaties occur, such as investment, 
administrative, and enforcement efficiencies.51 
As this Article discusses further below,52 the story of the symmetrical tax 
treaty is largely fictitious, calling into question whether the traditional account 
supporting the entrance into such obligations continues to hold true. Now that the 
U.S. is a major capital importer, it is puzzling that its treaty policy has stood still as 
its trade flows have reversed.53 
2. Double Taxation Relief Through Harmonization? 
If alleviation of double taxation is provided unilaterally through foreign tax 
credits, deductions, or exemption, even in the absence of the tax treaty regime, then 
it is possible that the treaties serve to alleviate double taxation when these measures 
fail, for instance by coordinating tax terms. Tax treaties, however, by and large do 
not resolve such matters. If a country taxes domestic source income, then one 
function of a tax treaty might be to ensure that what constitutes domestic (as 
opposed to foreign) source income is understood by all parties.54 In fact, treaties 
serve no such purposes, instead leaving the definition of source to the domestic 
rules. Although some treaties contain resourcing rules that may state that an item 
of income is treated as foreign source if a treaty partner is permitted to tax it, these 
                                                 
50 Kysar supra note 29, at  n. 18. 
51 DAGAN, supra note 4, at 45-46.  
52 See supra notes [ ] and accompanying text.  
53 H. David Rosenbloom, Toward a New Tax Treaty Policy for a New Decade, 9 AM. J. TAX POL. 
77, 83 (1991) (calling into question the wisdom of adhering to prior trade policy since it can no 
longer be assumed that U.S. investors abroad outnumber foreign investors in the United States).  
54 Owens, supra note 34, at 430.  
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are not always comprehensive.55 This amounts to a significant amount of double 
taxation that is left to be resolved through the treaty’s administrative solutions, such 
as the mutual agreement procedure and, increasingly, binding arbitration. Although 
such dispute resolution procedures might be important, they need not be 
accompanied by the shifting of tax jurisdiction between countries and could instead 
be set forth as standalone agreements.56  
Treaties also do not resolve conflicts of characterization, again leaving a 
significant amount of double taxation in place.57 This is because the treaties defer 
to the domestic rules to assign character of income. For instance, suppose the 
residence country characterizes income as royalties, thereby concluding that such 
income is exempt from source country taxation under the treaty and is taxable by 
the residence country. Further suppose the source country characterizes the income 
as compensation from personal services, in which case it is rightly subject to 
taxation by the source country under the treaty. This produces a conflict, which the 
treaties do not resolve.58 
Double taxation may also occur because the treaties do not contain a 
uniform and ascertainable definition of “covered taxes,” or the taxes for which the 
treaty country must provide relief from double taxation. In the U.S. Model Treaty, 
for instance, Article 2 states that the treaty applies to “federal income taxes imposed 
by the Internal Revenue Code,” and also covers “identical or substantially similar 
taxes that are imposed after the date of [the signing of the treaty] in addition to, or 
in place of, the existing taxes.” The term “covered taxes” is notoriously difficult to 
interpret and, in recent years, has become subject to intense debate.59  
                                                 
55 The U.S. Model Treaty currently has a general re-sourcing rule that is fairly comprehensive. It is 
intended to ensure that a U.S. resident can obtain a foreign tax credit when a treaty partner taxes 
the item of income in question. Technical Explanation of the 2006 U.S. Model Income Tax 
Convention, Art. 23(3). Many treaties in force, however, have far less comprehensive re-sourcing 
rules. New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Report on Treaty Re-Sourcing Rules 22-33 
(Nov. 24, 2014), at 
https://www.nysba.org/Sections/Tax/Tax_Section_Reports/Tax_Reports_2014/Tax_Section_Repo
rt_1313.html. 
56 Brooks & Krever, supra note 1, at 166. 
57 Id. at 168. 
58 See Boulez v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 584 (1984) (holding that payments to a music conductor 
were compensation for services, a category that did not get benefits under the relevant treaty, rather 
than royalties, which would have been tax-free under the treaty). Article 3(2) provides that if a term 
is not defined by the treaty, then the country that is applying the treaty should use its tax law to 
supply the term’s meaning, “unless the context otherwise requires.” One interpretation of Article 
3(2) is that only the source state can invoke it since it is the one typically applying the treaty. Avery 
Jones, supra note 1, at 18. The residence state, however, could take the position that it should apply 
its domestic laws in interpreting whether it must give relief for double taxation. In such cases, double 
taxation might ensue. 
59Fadi Shaheen, Destination-Based Cashflow Taxes and Tax Treaty Compatibility (draft on file with 
author); Richard Collier & Michael P. Devereux, The Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax and Double 
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Avoidance of double taxation is also often not achieved because 
transactions involve jurisdictions beyond those mentioned in the tax treaties.60 
Moreover, treaties address only juridical rather than economic double taxation, 
thereby allowing some double taxation to occur.61  
Tax treaties could resolve many of the above such matters, but the treaty 
language is often very general and its structure interstitial. This lack of specificity 
and comprehensiveness is most certainly a conscious choice by the treaty parties, 
who are reluctant to grant double tax relief in close cases. For the most part, these 
are, however, precisely those cases not granted relief under domestic law, and so 
one is left to wonder what tax treaties accomplish that is not already achieved under 
the statutes.  
3. Double Taxation as Red Herring 
Even if tax treaties were necessary to accomplish the avoidance of double 
taxation, it is unclear whether that goal should be pursued. To achieve double 
taxation relief would require more complete coordination, which may be 
undesirable given the centrality of taxation to the governmental function. As Daniel 
Shaviro has argued outside of the treaty context, nations may be reluctant to forfeit 
their independence in this area.62 Additionally, defining source “correctly” is, in 
many contexts, a fool’s errand. Economically speaking, multiple and overlapping 
jurisdictions generate income.63 Finally, Shaviro argues that the principle of taxing 
all income once will likely not enhance global efficiency. This is because countries 
vary in their tax rates; therefore taxing income once, and only once, does not yield 
                                                 
Tax Treaties, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working paper series (July 2017), at 
https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Working_Paper
s/Series_17/WP1706.pdf. Most recently, whether the new BEAT, enacted in the 2017 U.S. tax 
legislation, falls within the scope of Article 2 has become an area of live concern given that regime’s 
only partial creditability of foreign tax credits. See supra notes [ ] and accompanying discussion. 
60 EMILY FETT, TRIANGULAR CASES: THE APPLICATION OF BILATERAL INCOME TAX TREATIES IN 
MULTILATERAL SITUATIONS (2014).   
61 Yariv Brauner, Treaties in the Aftermath of BEPS, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 974, 986 (2016). 
Juridical double taxation is when the same taxpayer has to pay tax twice on the same income. 
Economic double taxation occurs when different taxpayers have to pay tax twice on the same 
income. See also Wei Cui, Minimalism about Source and Residence, 38 MICH. J. INT’L L. 245 (2017) 
(arguing that the invocation of double taxation overlooks the economic incidence of taxes).  
62 DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 113-14 (2014). 
63 Id. See also Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income: An Analysis of the 
U.S. System and its Economic Premises, in TAXATION OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 11, 30 (Assaf 
Razin & Joel Slemord, eds., 1990) (contending that “source” lacks economic content). But see 
Mitchell A. Kane, A Defense of Source Rules in International Taxation (defending the coherence of 
source although not necessarily on economic grounds).  
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any locational neutrality in investment decisions.64 Instead, taxpayers will decide 
where to conduct activity based on where the lowest tax rate can be obtained. In the 
real world, because of differences in tax regimes, double taxation of income may 
even increase global efficiency, if, for instance, this would create neutrality 
between a taxpayer facing a 20% rate in Country A versus a 40% rate in Country 
B.65 
Shaviro, however, goes on to conclude that the avoidance of double taxation 
may nonetheless be a worthy goal of bilateral tax treaties if the treaty countries have 
the same tax rates and equal cross-border capital flows.66 The avoidance of double 
taxation creates economic surplus by establishing neutrality between single-country 
and cross-country income. Because the countries are similarly situated, the 
concessions made by Country A in the above example in forgoing taxation of 
Country’s B residents are balanced by Country B’s similar concessions regarding 
its own residents.  
In reality, however, it is extremely unlikely that the two countries will be 
identically situated, both in tax rates and investment flows. This is especially true 
over time. Moreover, even if such homogeneity exists, the existence of tax havens 
likely creates imbalance between the two countries since it is likely that one 
country’s rules allow for more or less income-shifting to such havens.67 It is thus 
unclear what goal the avoidance of double taxation is serving, even in the treaty 
context. Indeed, the heterogeneity of treaty countries may explain the above 
observation—that treaties do not in fact ameliorate double taxation. Doing so would 
serve no efficiency goal nor would it be of equal desirability to each country.  
Another recent debate in the academic literature exposes what little work 
the concept of double taxation accomplishes in the treaty network. Recent proposals 
for reforming the U.S. international tax system deviate from the model of full 
creditability of foreign taxes under a worldwide system. Shaviro, for instance, has 
proposed a reduced rate for foreign source business income and the allowance of a 
deduction, rather than a credit, for foreign taxes paid. Part of Shaviro’s rationale 
stems from the conclusion that the foreign tax credit’s 100% marginal 
reimbursement rate (MRR) problematically makes taxpayers insensitive to foreign 
tax rates.68 This is against the national interest because the United States 
government ends up footing the bill for higher taxes abroad. Shaviro’s approach is 
similar to other proposals, such as Option Z and that of the former Obama 
                                                 
64 SHAVIRO, supra note 62, at 114.   
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 115.  
67 Id. at 115-116.   
68 Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Foreign Tax Creditability, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 709 (2010); see also 
Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56 TAX L. REV. 537, 568-
74 (2003) (reaching similar conclusions for foreign taxes on passive income). 
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administration.69 It also has been partially implemented in the 2017 legislation 
through the GILTI regime, which allows foreign tax credits of only 80%.  
It is an open issue whether these proposals or the GILTI regime comply 
with Article 23 of the treaties, which require either exemption or a credit for foreign 
taxes, but there is a persuasive argument that incarnations of them do. Although 
historically, the foreign tax credit is dollar for dollar, Fadi Shaheen argues that as a 
formal matter, and in furtherance of the purpose of the credit, it is acceptable to 
divide a dollar of foreign source income and allow credits on only a portion so long 
as the other portion is exempted.70 Option Z would have followed this approach 
explicitly, providing that foreign source income was 60% taxable with foreign tax 
credits and 40% exempt.71 GILTI is a variation of this approach, albeit more 
generous, since it is taxing only 50% of foreign source income while allowing 80% 
of foreign tax credits. Shaheen’s argument is that, under both the U.S. and OECD 
model treaties, these types of proposals are treaty-compliant so long as the exempt 
piece and the creditable piece of the income add up to at least 100%. 
Mitchell Kane agrees with Shaheen’s general conclusion that so long as the 
income can be separated into exempt and creditable portions, a mixture of these 
two approaches is treaty-compliant. Kane goes further to add that treaties prevent 
the resident country from causing its residents’ foreign source income to be taxed 
at a higher rate than domestic source income (taking into account both countries’ 
taxes). This means that if the source country imposes a higher tax than the residence 
country, then the residence country cannot impose any residence-based tax. If the 
source country taxes at a lower rate, than the residence country can tax the shortfall, 
but only up to its rate on domestic source income.72  
Drawing upon League of Nations documents, Kane’s argues that double 
taxation does not really mean double taxation.73 Instead, in the treaty sense, the 
benchmark simply means whether the overall tax burden exceeds that that would 
have been imposed by the residence country on domestic source income. Tax 
treaties, in other words, are about capping rates rather than double taxation per se. 
In pursuing this goal, they strive towards a particular result rather than a particular 
method.74  
                                                 
69 Shaviro himself notes these similarities. Daniel Shaviro, Response to Comments on Fixing 
International Taxation, 9 JRSLM. REV. LEGAL STUD. 132, 140-41 (2014). 
70 Fadi Shaheen, How Reform-Friendly are U.S. Tax Treaties?, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1243. 1250-
51 (2016).  
71 STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., JCX-15-13, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF 
THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE CHAIRMAN’S STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT OF PROVISIONS TO 
REFORM INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TAXATION (Comm. Print 2013).  
72 Kane, supra note 19. 
73 Kane, supra note 19, at 47. 
74 Id.  
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Under this framework, what obligation to credit foreign taxes does the 
residence country have when it imposes a lower rate on foreign source income than 
it does on domestic source income? Kane admits this is a question that the treaty 
drafters did not specifically contemplate, but using the above framework, this set 
of facts should reduce the burden of juridical double taxation and the corresponding 
obligation arising under Article 23. In such cases, Kane reasons that a partial credit, 
rather than a dollar for dollar credit, will satisfy Article 23 so long as the overall 
tax burden does not exceed that imposed on domestic source income.  
Both Kane’s and Shaheen’s analysis seem to suggest that Article 23’s 
central concern is aggregate tax burden rather than the method of double tax relief, 
albeit Kane’s conclusion is more explicit in this regard. If double taxation seems 
like a normatively empty goal, does aggregate tax burden fare any better? It would 
seem, after all, that investors care about the overall level of tax they are paying 
rather than whether income is technically taxed once, twice, or multiple times. 
Double taxation could lead to better tax results than single taxation, if for instance 
two countries imposed 10% tax and a single country imposed a 30% tax.  
It seems rational, then, that countries should care more about overall 
taxation rather than double taxation. It also seems in the countries’ interest to 
preserve a mixture of double tax relief methods, as Kane concludes. From the 
perspective of the residence country, worldwide taxation with full foreign tax credit 
relief cuts off tax competition since the source country cannot set the tax burden on 
the foreign source income, whereas under an exemption system, the source country 
can do so. But the former system also makes its investors insensitive to local tax 
rates and may overly burden its residents. From the perspective of the source 
country, it may prefer residence country exemption since it gets to set the tax rates, 
however the source country may enjoy the ability to increase revenues without the 
foreign resident facing an increased tax burden, as is possible under the credit 
system.75  
In Kane’s view, both residence and source countries would prefer a treaty 
that preserves policy mixture so that they can balance these various and competing 
goals rather than a system that forces them into pure credit or pure exemption 
approaches. And, under Kane’s view, the former system is indeed what we have. 
Kane is likely right that a hybrid approach to international taxation makes the most 
sense strategically and indeed is reflected in the treaties and nearly all international 
tax systems. But a further question arises as to whether the treaty is doing any work 
here.  
If it is in the unilateral interest of both nations to have a mixed system, then 
that is likely what will arise without tax treaties. Indeed, the flexibility of the 
treaties, as interpreted by Kane and Shaheen, means that neither nation has settled 
                                                 
75 Id.  
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upon which degree of rate competition versus revenue collection they would prefer, 
instead leaving it up to the domestic policies of the residence country. The source 
country, in other words, remains beholden to the policy choices of the treaty 
partner.  
One concession that the source country does obtain, at least under Kane’s 
view, is that overall taxation will be capped at the residence country’s tax rate on 
domestic source income. Query, however, whether this is any sort of meaningful 
promise. Overall taxation still depends on the domestic rates of the residence 
country; nothing in the treaty prevents very high taxation so long as the residence 
country also imposes such rates on domestic source income. There are political and 
practical constraints, however, on the ability of the residence country to tax foreign 
source income more heavily than domestic source income.  
In fact, it is generally the opposite that we worry about—that foreign source 
income goes undertaxed by the residence country. This outcome results because 
there are convincing reasons a residence country would prefer to more lightly tax 
foreign source income than domestic source income. While location-specific rents, 
as well as a robust labor market, might support a high U.S. tax rate on domestic 
source income, such factors likely do not support taxation of foreign source income 
at the same levels.76 In other words, it is efficient for a country to tax foreign source 
income at a lower rate than domestic source income because it can exercise its 
market power more with respect to the latter, thereby making the former more tax-
elastic. On the other hand, the residence country should prefer to impose some 
degree of taxation on a resident company’s foreign source income since doing so 
discourages profit-shifting and also brings in revenues.77 
Perhaps because of this balancing act, every tax system unilaterally seems 
to tax foreign source income of resident companies more lightly than domestic 
source income. In the old worldwide system, the United States’ tolerance of deferral 
effectively created a disparity in the rates on domestic and foreign source income, 
favoring the latter. Under the new system, that choice is more explicit, with foreign 
source income obtaining a 50% deduction. And in pure territorial systems, active 
foreign source income is exempt. Thus, it seems that this purported goal for tax 
treaties—to constrain the top rate residence countries can impose on foreign source 
income—would likely be achieved in the absence of the treaties. Although Kane 
and Shaheen’s careful work is helpful in detailing how tax treaties can 
accommodate this type of tax reform, we have yet to find a good reason for tax 
treaties in the first place.  
Finally, without the concept of double taxation as a guide for setting 
jurisdictional limits, there does not seem to be any basis to have strict reciprocity 
                                                 
76 Daniel Shaviro, The Crossroads Versus the Seesaw, 69 TAX L. REV. 1, 10 (2015).  
77 Shaviro, supra note 31. 
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of rates through a bilateral solution. Domestic legislation could instead achieve 
lower withholding rates.  
B. The Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
The other stated purpose of tax treaties is the prevention of fiscal evasion.  
Traditionally, this rationale supported the exchange of relevant information. Article 
26, which implements this principle, however, is ineffective. In both the U.S. and 
OECD Model treaties, a party does not have to provide information “which is not 
obtainable under the laws or in the normal course of the administration” or “which 
would disclose any trade, business, industrial, commercial, or professional secret 
or trade process.”78 For many years, countries like Luxembourg and Switzerland 
took the position that these carve-outs specifically allowed bank secrecy to trump 
information exchange.79 
More generally, a treaty is an odd mechanism to induce banking havens to 
share information. The United States may care very deeply about wanting 
information from a banking haven, but there is no reciprocal desire on the haven’s 
side. They therefore have no incentive to fulfill their agreement.80 Moreover, when 
evasion spans multiple countries, the bilateral format of the income tax treaty does 
little to solve the problem.81 
To the extent exchange of information by international agreement is 
desirable, there are other means to achieve it. Tax information exchange agreements 
(TIEAs) based on a 2002 OECD model agreement allow countries to exchange 
information on taxpayers without also reallocating taxing jurisdiction. In their first 
decade, over 500 TIEAs were entered into.82 Newer tools, like domestic legislation 
and implementing bilateral agreements, can also be utilized to yield information 
exchange. In 2010, for instance, the United States enacted the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act (FATCA) to stop tax evasion by its residents. FATCA requires 
foreign banks and financial institutions to provide information on U.S. taxpayers 
and their financial accounts. The novel feature of FATCA is a 30% withholding tax 
on U.S. source income paid to taxpayers that have not provided information 
regarding their residency or identity of their owners. 
                                                 
78 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 26; ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., MODEL 
CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL, art. 26 (2014) (hereinafter 
OECD Model Treaty). 
79 Lee Sheppard, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Part 4: Ineffectual Information Sharing, 63 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 1139 (2009). 
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 Org. For Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Tax Information Exchange Agreements, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-
information/taxinformationexchangeagreementstieas.htm (listing such agreements) 
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FATCA requirements, in most cases, violated the financial institution’s 
countries’ internal laws. Intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) became necessary 
to implement FATCA. According to Treasury, the United States has agreed upon 
113 IGAs since 2010.83 Subsequent to FATCA, the OECD developed the Common 
Reporting Standard (CRS) based on the IGAs. It is an automatic information 
exchange, which over 100 countries have agreed to implement, and allows other 
countries to implement FATCA-like obligations with non-US counterparties.84   
Clearly, FATCA has been a watershed act, and, along with the rise of other 
instruments, calls into question the continuing relevance of Article 26. Although 
IGAs, in their current form, lack reciprocal commitments by the United States, 
IGAs have done much to eliminate bank secrecy worldwide and have also 
influenced a global information exchange network. The information exchange 
world has clearly moved beyond double income tax treaties. 
C. Double Non-Taxation 
In accordance with the BEPS plan, the purpose of treaties has since grown 
to encompass the principle of double non-taxation, supporting devices like 
limitation on benefits provisions and the unilateral override provisions in the new 
U.S. model treaty.85 Although these developments combat treaty abuse and double 
non-taxation, they are effectively solving problems created by the treaties 
themselves and therefore cannot be invoked to justify the existence of tax treaties, 
as will be explained below.   
What is double non-taxation and why is it problematic? After all, almost 
every type of taxation distorts economic activity so should not less taxation assist 
in the free movement of capital? Double non-taxation generally means income that 
is otherwise typically taxed in one jurisdiction ends up being taxed nowhere. The 
phenomenon is sometimes referred to in the literature as stateless income or 
                                                 
83 U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx (listing such 
agreements). These agreements are at various stages of completion and, in some cases, have only 
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homeless income.86 The OECD describes double non-taxation as leading to “a 
reduction of the overall tax paid by all parties involved as a whole, which harms 
competition, economic efficiency, transparency and fairness.”87 One primary 
concern with double non-taxation is the creation of a race to the bottom, whereby 
all jurisdictions are worse off due to tax competition. Another concern is the 
preference of cross-border income as contrasted with wholly domestic income, a 
concern expressed in the State Aid cases.88  
Resolving the phenomena is difficult as a conceptual matter because the 
problem results from the sovereignty of countries over their own tax systems. Since 
tax treaties, in their current incarnation, never require taxation of income but instead 
function as devices that limit taxing jurisdiction, it is unclear how they can ever 
solve the problem of double non-taxation. Instead, tax treaties tend to create double 
non-taxation because they allow taxpayers to combine reduced treaty rates on 
source-based withholding taxes with favorable domestic tax rules.89 In order to fix 
double non-taxation, domestic law must be utilized, and, at best, tax treaties can be 
designed to not make the situation worse.90  
What features, then, of tax treaties give rise to double non-taxation? This 
stems from the grand bargain struck between source and residence countries, with 
the residence countries obtaining the right to tax “residual” income after a minimal 
amount of income has been allocated to the source country.91 As Brett Wells and 
Cym H. Lowell have stated, “our treaties were premised on the concept of 
allocating income to prevent double taxation, but the result is that they have 
achieved double non-taxation.”92 The two demonstrate that the phenomenon of 
double non-taxation (or “homeless income”, in their words) arises from the League 
of Nations’ choice to adopt a residence-based approach rather than one based on 
profit-splitting.  
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The question that the tax treaties were originally trying to resolve was how 
to allocate income between a parent company, typically located in a mercantilist 
country like England (the “residence” country, in today’s terminology), and its 
supply, manufacturing, and shipping subsidiaries, typically located in British 
Commonwealth countries like India (the “source 
 country). The subsidiaries would pay “base erosion payments,” such as interest, 
royalties, service fees, and leasehold payment to the parent, which would be 
deductible against their colonial income tax. In this manner, residual profits were 
stripped out of the source country, leaving it only the ability to tax routine profits.93  
Under these facts, the income is being taxed by the mercantilist country. 
With the interposition of a holding company situated in a tax haven, however, the 
residual profits could be shifted to a jurisdiction that does not tax such income 
through base erosion payments. Although the colonial country could assert that the 
arm’s length principle allocates it a certain portion of the profit, typically transfer 
pricing methods are limited to the income that should be received by the source 
country, thereby failing to police the income allocated to the holding company.94 
As Wells and Lowell note, this planning strategy primarily stems from several 
elements bound up in the tax treaty framework: the decision to allocate residual 
income to the residence country, with the source country only taxing local 
operations; the interposition of a holding company that is not treated as a permanent 
establishment and is entitled to receive residual income (and thereby treated as 
situated in the residence country); and the deployment of one-sided transfer 
pricing.95  
In pursuing the approach ultimately adopted by the League of Nations 
treaty, the four economists were aware of the danger that holding companies in tax 
havens posed.96 They recognized that such subsidiaries allowed the allocation of 
income to a country that was neither a source or residence country, thus creating 
the potential for electivity into a low-taxed regime. Perhaps, though, they glossed 
over these concerns because they assumed the residence country would ultimately 
find ways to tax such income. As it turns out, however, income shifted to holding 
companies has gone largely untaxed by the residence country. Tax competition has 
spurred residence countries in this direction, less they face expatriation by their 
multinational corporations to a country that does not tax such income.97 
For instance, even under its former worldwide system, the United States 
allowed deferral on income allocated to subsidiaries in tax havens. Although 
various outbound regimes, such as controlled foreign corporation rules, and 
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inbound regimes (such as earnings-stripping and thin capitalization rules) have 
attempted to tax such income, tax competition has also caused countries to 
rationally tolerate profit shifting. Arguably, the new tax regime instituted by the 
United States, with BEAT and GILTI, will strengthen taxation of previously 
untaxed earnings. In previous work, however, I have argued that the new law 
largely keeps base erosion and profit shifting incentives intact.98 CBO estimates 
that nearly 80% of profit shifting is maintained under the new regime. 
Congressional Budget Office.99 The effect on profit shifting is likely even smaller, 
however, since CBO does not take into account investor reactions to the instability 
of the FDII regime in response to WTO challenges, investor reactions to the 
political instability of the legislation in general, and tax competition from other 
countries.100 Furthermore, commentators and treaty partners have critiqued the new 
provisions for violating the tax treaties. As a result, U.S. lawmakers may face future 
pressures to curtail the regimes on a bilateral basis.  
Tax treaties, however, do seem to be inching closer to addressing double 
non-taxation.101 As stated in the official press release of the new model treaty, 
Treasury has taken the position that tax treaties “should eliminate double taxation 
without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax 
evasion or avoidance.”102 To further this relatively modest goal, the new model 
treaty contains somewhat unique “kill-switch” provisions that turn off treaty 
benefits if income is subject to low or no taxation.103 For instance, the special tax 
regime provisions deny treaty benefits on deductible interest or royalties to related 
persons that face low or no taxation under a preferential tax regime.104 In this 
manner, the rules preserve source taxation when the residence country forgoes 
taxation of the item of income. The treaty also provides that treaty benefits with 
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regard to dividends, interest, royalties, and other income may be denied if a treaty 
partner either (a) reduces its tax rates to below the lesser of 15 percent of 60 percent 
of the general statutory rate or (b) switches to a territorial regime. Other changes to 
both the U.S. and OECD model treaties attempt to minimize double non-taxation. 
These include addressing exempt permanent establishments, revisions to the 
limitation on benefits provisions, rules on expatriated entities, and the new general 
anti-abuse rule adopted in the multilateral treaty. 
Reuven Avi-Yonah has argued that the international tax regime embraces a 
principle that income should be taxed once, and only once.105 He has pointed to 
these recent treaty developments as further indication that the world is converging 
upon this “single tax principle.”106 Ample room for double non-taxation under the 
treaties still exists, however. There is much uncertainty as to the definition of what 
constitutes a “special tax regime” if such regimes are not explicitly identified during 
the treaty negotiations. Moreover, if such a regime is implemented through 
administrative practice, the United States might not be able to detect it if it cannot 
access taxpayer-specific rulings.107  
Finally, it is the treaty regime and its fundamental bargain between source 
and residence countries that is the primary cause of a great deal of double non-
taxation. That treaty partners are now undoing some of the treaties’ contribution to 
double non-taxation through mechanisms like the unilateral override and anti-abuse 
provisions cannot be seen as justification of the continued existence of the treaty 
system. 
D. Foreign Direct Investment 
Increased foreign direct investment (FDI) is another cited reason for tax 
treaties. We would expect foreign direct investment to increase upon entrance into 
a tax treaty for two reasons. First, if tax treaties really do alleviate double taxation, 
a proposition of which I am dubious, then we would expect foreign direct 
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investment between the two countries to increase. Second, the treaties may enhance 
the treaty country’s reputation among the global economy, a benefit that would 
expand as the country’s treaty network expands.108 
Empirical evidence on whether tax treaties bring in foreign direct 
investment, however, is mixed.109 Several older studies looked at changes in FDI 
on a jurisdictional basis as countries entered into tax treaties and concluded that 
there was no increase in FDI. Newer studies have looked at whether a greater 
number of tax treaties is correlated with higher FDI and have found a positive 
relationship between the two.110 It is difficult to confirm causation, however, “since 
treaties may precede investment not because they spur the latter but because they 
may be concluded only when there is an expectation of such investment.”111 In the 
United States, for instance, this is a built-in feature of treaty policy.112 
One other study has reached both conclusions—that the number of treaties 
that a source country has signed with the United States is positively correlated with 
FDI from the United States while also concluding that there is a negative correlation 
between new and existing treaties with the United States and such FDI.113 One 
explanation for this is that a large network of treaties increases profit shifting 
through the source country by means of treaty shopping. On the other hand, new 
and existing treaties that are renegotiated may reduce FDI and reinvested earnings 
because of the information sharing and tax cooperation features of tax treaties.114  
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The FDI effect is likely to be particularly muted in the case of developed 
countries like the United States since the treaty is not needed to signal regime 
stability to investors in that context. Moreover, if tax treaties are increasing FDI 
because of treaty shopping, developed countries may not benefit from that effect 
given the relatively higher rates of taxation imposed by such countries.  
Furthermore, investment in the United States may also be more inelastic 
than other jurisdictions. This may be the case if demand for U.S. assets is robust 
enough to support withholding.115 For instance, although the United States taxes 
real property, foreign ownership of U.S. real assets remains robust.116 The strong 
U.S. market for goods and services may mean that foreign demand could support 
higher withholding rates on outbound flows.117  
Finally, although the U.S. statutory withholding rate of 30% is quite high, 
it is unclear anyone actually pays it, even without a treaty, given the portfolio 
interest exemption and availability of derivatives that are not subject to withholding 
tax.118 In this sense, the reduced treaty rates do little work. If treaties did not exist, 
then surely the domestic withholding rate would be set much lower, thereby 
alleviating concerns of over-taxation. In all likelihood, the reason that the 30% rate 
has held so long is that it is a way for the United States to preserve its negotiating 
position.119  
E. Comity Considerations 
Related to the issue of increased foreign direct investment, it is also posited 
that countries enter into tax treaties for comity reasons.120 Tax treaties solidify 
relationships between countries and create communication channels between their 
taxing authorities.121 For developing countries especially, entering into the “club” 
of tax treaties improves a nation’s standing in the international arena, serving as a 
“stamp of approval.”122 Signing a tax treaty signals that the country “is willing to 
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adopt the international norms,” which may have positive effects in non-tax areas as 
well.123 
Although such benefits might accrue to a developing country attempting to 
gain a seat at the table, they are less likely to sway the position of the United States, 
whose existing trade relationships and agreements with other countries dwarf the 
impact of tax treaties. Moreover, an established tax administration that is willing to 
robustly enforce tax norms, like the IRS, produces a more effective signaling effect 
to other nations.124 Comity considerations should therefore be relatively minor in 
factoring into the decision of whether the United States should enter into tax 
treaties. 
F. Certainty and Predictability 
Tax treaties are also said to signify a stable and certain legal regime. Many 
would argue that the current international tax regime is fairly harmonized, and this 
is partly due to the existence of the treaty network. The OECD Model has been 
incredibly influential, and the more than 3,000 tax treaties in existence are based 
upon it.125 One scholar has noted that “[o]ne can pick up any modern tax treaty and 
immediately find one’s way around, often even down to the article number.”126 As 
a result, tax treaties are quite similar to one another.  
To the extent that standardization of international tax rules has occurred, 
however, we see it outside of the tax treaty context as well—in the domestic laws 
of nations.127 For instance, in the United States, a foreign person will be taxed on 
U.S. business income if it is “effectively connected” to a “U.S. trade or business.” 
Tax treaties attempt to clarify and harmonize this concept by narrowing source 
country jurisdiction over “business profits” that are “attributable to a permanent 
establishment.”128 The treaty standard, however, appears to be no clearer that the 
domestic one, causing many to conclude that it is essentially equivalent to the 
domestic standard.129 Indeed, some of the U.S. tax treaties explicitly define the term 
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“business profits” in a way that references the domestic law.130 The Service has 
drawn upon domestic law to interpret what constitutes a “permanent 
establishment,” referencing concepts that are also used to determine the domestic 
standard.131 This is the case for other treaty terms as well.132 
As stated earlier, the treaties generally defer to domestic law to answer 
vexing and central questions as to the residency of the taxpayer, what type of 
income is at issue, and the definition of income taxes.133 Tax treaties are primarily 
jurisdictional devices and mostly lack operative provisions of law that would more 
meaningfully harmonize the tax regimes of various nations.134 Even as 
jurisdictional devices, however, the treaties merely “state general taxing principles” 
whereas “Code provisions are tailored to specific situations.”135  
The extent to which tax treaties harmonize international law is thus limited. 
This may be due to various reasons. For one, tax law is an area of law that has to 
address nearly all economic activities and encompasses all business entities and 
individuals, all while aiming to meet critical revenue-raising and redistribution 
goals.136 Given the complexities of these tasks, an intricate body of domestic law 
has arisen. Even still, the statutory text does not often address the specific fact 
pattern in question and thus reliance upon non-textual sources is necessary to fill 
interpretive gaps.137 Plain meaning interpretation also often seems inappropriate in 
the tax setting given the self-containing nature of tax law, which creates specialized 
tax terms that do not have analogues in everyday conversation.138 The highly 
detailed character of the domestic law means that treaty-makers may be unable to 
incorporate concepts directly; instead they intentionally leave gaps in the treaty so 
that domestic law can fill in the details.139  
Another reason for the gaps in treaties is the connection between taxation 
and state sovereignty.140 Treaties often defer to domestic law so that nations can 
retain some control over tax policy. Although international law always implicates 
                                                 
130 Yariv Brauner & Allison Christians, The Meaning of ‘Enterprise, ‘Business’ and ‘Business 
Profits under Tax Treaties and Domestic Law 19, in THE MEANING OF ‘ENTERPRISE,’ ‘BUSINESS’ 
AND ‘BUSINESS PROFITS’ UNDER TAX TREATIES AND EU TAX LAW (Guglielmo Maisto, ed., 2011). 
131 Kysar supra note 29, at 1413-1414 
132 Brauner & Christians, supra note 130, at 21 (“In general, the terms ‘business, enterprise, and 
business profits’ as used in the U.S. tax treaties are not autonomous but derive their meaning from 
domestic tax law provisions.”).  
133 See supra notes [ ] and accompanying text. Kysar supra note 29, at 1411-12. 
134 Kysar supra note 29, at 1411. 
135 KLAUS VOGEL ET AL., UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES 26 (1989). 
136 Kysar supra note 29, at 1414.  
137 Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the 
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 829–30 (1991). 
138 Id. at 828-29. 
139 Kysar supra note 29, at 1416. 
140 Id at 1416.  
29 
 
sovereignty concerns, these issues are particularly strong in the tax context given 
that taxation implicates the revenue function of a nation, which in turns provides 
public goods and national defense.141 Taxation is also a key component of a nation’s 
fiscal policy, which allows it to affect growth, prices, and unemployment.142  
It is also important to note that, unlike in the trade context where multilateral 
cooperation can contribute simultaneously to worldwide and national efficiency, 
international tax is predominantly a zero sum game.143 For all of these reasons, we 
should expect a significant degree of retention of sovereignty in the tax treaty 
context. In fact, we do see this, both implicitly, through ambiguity in the treaties, 
and explicitly, through incorporation of the domestic tax laws.144 Accordingly, the 
degree to which tax treaties can provide certainty through the harmonization of tax 
concepts and terms is limited.  
As for stability, the network of more than 3,000 treaties provides some 
benefits in this regard. Indeed, as Tsilly Dagan has noted, the treaty system creates 
a lock-in effect, which makes transition to a different system more difficult.145 
There is, however, a serious cost to this stability, the dangers of which have become 
apparent. Long after the system proves useful, it will continue.  
G. Ancillary Functions 
Tax treaties also may serve ancillary goals such as the prevention of non-
discrimination or the resolution of tax disputes between the governments. Both of 
these goals can be accomplished via other means, however. Tax treaties require 
competent authorities to endeavor to resolve cross-border tax disputes and, 
increasingly, provide for mandatory arbitration. As was the case with information 
exchange, there is no need to couple this goal with the divvying up of taxing 
jurisdiction.146 Other international agreements, like the approach taken by the 
European Union, can serve the same purpose.147 
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Tax treaties also are said to accelerate international investment through their 
nondiscrimination clauses, which require that the treaty partners tax domestic and 
foreign investors similarly.148 These clauses appear in every U.S. tax treaty in force, 
as well as the model U.S. and OECD tax treaties.149 Again, nondiscrimination could 
also be accomplished without the loss of taxing rights, perhaps through investment 
treaties or domestic legislation.150 Indeed, major multilateral and regional trade 
agreements already contain mandates against tax discrimination.151 The 
nondiscrimination principle as articulated in tax treaties was originally intended 
only to mirror existing obligations under the commercial treaties and, as a result, 
was not expected to have a meaningful impact.152 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its later WTO-
enforced incarnations limit export subsidies (in addition to tariffs on imports). 
Export subsidies can include income tax incentives, and these agreements have 
been used against several U.S. tax regimes.153 Some trade treaties limit their reach 
to other income tax provisions, but it is possible they could also prohibit income 
tax benefits such as accelerated depreciation or tax credits to machinery and 
equipment that is produced domestically.154 
Although there is overlap between tax and trade treaties in how they treat 
discrimination, the concepts are framed differently and have variances in scope.155 
There are arguments, however, that trade treaties may be more effective means than 
tax treaties against tax discrimination. The WTO is a more representative body than 
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the OECD, has a larger jurisdiction, and the trade agreements contain more binding 
dispute resolution mechanisms.156 That being said, international trade agreements 
are currently suffering from serious political scrutiny and instability.  
Another issue with tax discrimination is that it is a notoriously ambiguous 
and, at times, narrow concept.157 Under the “nationality paragraph” of Article 24, 
the treaties bar the source country from taxing foreign enterprises operating in that 
country in a way that is “more burdensome” than nationals of the source state in 
“the same circumstances.”158 Its scope is limited since the treaties define “similar 
circumstances” as excluding U.S. nationals that are taxed on a worldwide basis. 
This preserves the ability of the United States, for instance, to impose gross basis 
withholding taxes on nonresident aliens since they are not in the same 
circumstances as a nonresident U.S. citizen (who gets taxed on a net basis).159 In 
the case of corporations, this carve-out means the nondiscrimination principle has 
very limited impact in the United States because a corporation that is incorporated 
abroad is, by definition, not in the same circumstances as a corporation that is 
incorporated in the U.S.160 Other countries may define corporate residency on the 
basis of other factors, such as place of management, in which case 
nondiscrimination may have more impact.161  
Under the permanent establishment paragraph of Article 24, a country is 
prohibited from subjecting the permanent establishment (essentially the fixed place 
of business) of a resident of the other country to “less favorable” taxation than its 
own residents “carrying on the same activities.”162 The permanent establishment 
paragraph has no such carveout for residency, but it is often a struggle for courts 
and the Service to determine whether foreign residents are “carrying on the same 
activities” as residents of the permanent establishment country.163 Although one 
U.S. court has found that a U.S. tax provision violated this paragraph, Treasury and 
the Service have traditionally taken a very narrow view of this phrase.164 For 
instance, in assessing thin capitalization rules, which deny certain interest 
deductions for payments to related foreign persons, the position of the United States 
has been that these rules do not violate nondiscrimination because they also deny 
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deductibility to related domestic tax-exempt entities.165 This defense is arguably 
unconvincing since the nonresident, for-profit lender should be compared to a 
resident, for-profit lender.166 European courts, in contrast, have given the paragraph 
more robust interpretations.167 
Given the uncertainty surrounding the nondiscrimination principle and the 
large divide between countries in interpreting it, query whether it would be more 
effective to enact it as a domestic provision, or, as previously mentioned, through 
our trade treaties given the greater consensus, and means to achieve consensus, in 
that area. These routes may be a more forceful means at ensuring equal treatment 
of investments. Regardless, it does not appear that the nondiscrimination principle 
in treaties is providing a great deal of reciprocal protection, and in any case, 
nondiscrimination could be incorporated into tax agreements that do not cede 
jurisdiction over the tax base. 
III. DISADVANTAGES OF TAX TREATIES 
 
The above discussion concludes that the rationales for tax treaties are 
opaque and ultimately unconvincing. Meanwhile, the disadvantages they bring to 
the United States government are potentially significant, as this Part explores.  
A. Loss of Revenues 
Scholars have argued that the reciprocal nature of tax treaties disadvantages 
developing countries by allocating taxing jurisdiction, and hence shifting revenues, 
from the country where the income is earned, typically the developing country, to 
the country of the taxpayer’s residence, typically the developed country.168 This 
literature points to the asymmetry of the countries’ investments flows as the source 
of the treaty process’s unfairness toward developing nations. Proponents of this 
view also cite economic evidence, discussed above, that tax treaties have no effect, 
or even a negative effect, on foreign direct investment, meaning that the developing 
country has sacrificed revenues for little to no advantage in capturing investment.169  
The common account is that treaties between developed nations do not 
cause similar revenue shifts since the countries are similarly situated. Yet 
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conclusions from the developing country literature can be extended to treaties that 
the United States enters with other developed nations when the investment flows 
between those countries differ, as is often the case in the modern era.   
The treaty policy of the United States has remained relatively static since 
the 1960s, even though the United States has swung from being the world’s most 
important net capital exporter to being a net capital importer due to the massive 
increase of foreign investment into the United States.170 The change means that the 
United States, in many cases, will lose revenue as a result of entering into the treaty 
whereas before it was likely to gain revenues.171 In spite of the variances of capital 
flows, both historically and between nations, tax treaties remain markedly similar 
to one another and to their predecessors.172 This dynamic stands in contrast to the 
bilateral investment treaty context, where the United States has recognized its status 
as a capital importer and has taken a more balanced approach towards weighing its 
investors’ interests against state sovereignty rather than protecting just the 
former.173 
To be fair, the United States may be a net exporter of certain types of capital 
and capital flows may reverse rather quickly.174 That being said, the United States 
has been a net importer in the aggregate for decades so it is surprising that its basic 
negotiating positions on tax treaties have not changed, in contrast to bilateral 
investment treaties. One possible explanation is that under the latter, the United 
States is often sued as a source country, thus compelling it to reexamine its 
negotiating stances ex ante.  
It may also be possible that, although the United States runs a deficit in the 
aggregate, it runs surpluses with treaty countries. Given the massive influx of 
capital into the United States in recent decades, however, this would be 
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surprising.175 Frustratingly, the Joint Committee of Taxation makes no revenue 
estimates for tax treaties nor does it include them in the tax expenditure budget. 
This is because the treaties are Article II treaties and bypass the normal budget 
process.176 The executive branch has also chosen not to provide formal economic 
analyses of tax treaties.177   
Although I do not purport to undertake such a formal analysis here, I have 
examined a set of data regarding trade, capital, and financial flows in an attempt to 
shed some modest insight into whether treaties make economic sense for the United 
States. Scholars have long pointed out that investment flow imbalances cause 
differences in revenue flows under tax treaties, but, to my knowledge, there has 
been no attempt to look at those flows in any detail, particularly on a system wide 
basis.  
[Note to readers: the below data collection and analysis is preliminary.] 
 
First, I surveyed the bilateral balance of payments data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, which consists of flow data for any given quarter since 2003. 
Of the sixty-six countries listed on the IRS website as having tax treaties with the 
United States, this data included that of sixteen countries.178 Of those sixteen 
countries, U.S. residents were net borrowers from current, capital account, and 
financial-account transactions in thirteen countries over the time span from 2003 to 
2017, amounting to net borrowing of approximately $11 trillion or an average 
$735.2 billion per year.179 They were net lenders in only three countries.180 For 
financial-account transactions alone over this time span, U.S. residents were net 
borrowers in eleven and net lenders in five,181 amounting to net lending of 
approximately $3.9 trillion or an average $260.3 billion per year. We could roughly 
estimate, then, that a supermajority of these sixteen tax treaties are losing revenues.  
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Second, I studied the U.S. Department of Treasury Annual Survey of 
Portfolio Holdings, which consists of stock data at particular points in a given year 
since 2003, with additional data in 1994, 1997, and 2001 as well. The Annual 
Survey lists both the value of foreign holdings of U.S. securities and the value of 
U.S. portfolio holdings of foreign securities. Of the sixty-six countries listed on the 
IRS website, two countries did not have sufficient security holdings to list. The rest 
were examined. Notably, the Treasury data revealed the U.S. had inflows of capital 
greater than outflows with respect to the tax treaty countries in every year in which 
data was collected except two (2006 and 1994). From 2003 to 2017, the net flows 
were negative by $22.14 trillion or an average of $1.476 trillion per year. Once 
again, it would seem that the U.S. is losing revenues from the tax treaty system as 
a whole. 
I also looked at the relative flows of each country for the year 2017. Of the 
countries examined, thirty-six had inflows greater than outflows, meaning there 
were more holdings by that country’s residents of U.S. securities than U.S. holdings 
of those country’s securities. Twenty-eight countries had outflows greater than 
inflows, meaning that U.S. investors held more of those countries’ securities than 
vice versa. Notably, the amount of inflows, in total, exceeded outflows by $4.54 
trillion for that year.  
There are, of course, caveats to this analysis. First, bilateral economic flows 
cannot tell us the revenue picture in its entirety. Any formal analysis should account 
for increased investment as a result of the treaty, for instance. Second, even for the 
flow data, these are just snapshots in time, reflecting only the current economic 
position of the United States via its treaty partners. That being said, because the 
treaties are so entrenched, one can see the danger of committing to them given the 
fact that economic flows can reverse rather quickly and dramatically. This 
highlights the difficulty of tax treaties more generally. Third, we could imagine that 
the breakdown of flows differs between income types, which may be relevant in 
calculating revenue losses from the treaties. For instance, if the U.S. is a capital 
exporter for royalties, then perhaps it is gaining from the treaties even if it is capital 
importing with respect to other types of income, like interest. This is because the 
treaty restricts source country jurisdiction over royalties but generally does not alter 
the treatment of interest, which is generally exempt under the U.S. portfolio interest 
rules.182 
Revenue losses can also come about because of the interaction between the 
domestic law and the treaty or the disparity in tax systems.183 For instance, one 
could imagine that two similarly situated countries would sign a tax treaty, 
reasoning that any rate reduction they provide on source income from the other 
country’s residents would be counterbalanced by an increase in domestic taxes 
                                                 
182 26 U.S.C. § 871 
183 See Roin, supra note 45, at 1767. 
36 
 
through the residual taxation of foreign source income of its own residents, who are 
now also receiving the benefit of lower rates in the other country. If, however, a 
country does not tax on a worldwide basis, the calculus is different. Its residents 
may enjoy the lower foreign rate, unencumbered by residual taxation. The territorial 
regime means that the lower foreign tax treaty rates will not effectuate an increase 
in domestic revenues. This bargain may still be in the country’s interest, but the 
benefits are flowing to its residents rather than to government coffers.184  
The 2017 changes to the U.S. international tax system are likely to 
complicate the revenue picture of U.S. tax treaties. For one, the partial transition to 
a territorial system means that the United States is forgoing residual taxation as a 
residence state on foreign income earned by closely held corporations.185 Yet this 
is counterbalanced by the new minimum tax regime that is imposed on such 
income. The reduction of the corporate rate all the way to 21% means that no 
residual taxation will be paid on foreign income so long as U.S. corporations are 
taxed at a 13.125% rate abroad.186  
This picture is further exacerbated by the fact that the blending of tax credits 
is allowed to reduce tax liability under residual taxation for individuals and others 
who do not receive the benefits of territoriality. Treaties allow taxpayers to cross 
credit income that receives favorable treaty rates with high taxed income, thereby 
minimizing the limitation on foreign tax credits under U.S. law.187 This dynamic 
will also occur under the new minimum tax regime, leading to further revenue 
losses.  
On the flipside, because the U.S. is no longer recouping residual taxation 
on a significant amount of foreign income, we could expect that some countries 
will push for more tax treaties with the United States since the reductions in source 
taxation that they agree to will benefit U.S. investors rather than the U.S. Treasury. 
Presumably, this strengthens the case for increased foreign direct investment. Still, 
some countries may worry that a move to territoriality may instead trigger an 
undesirable race to the bottom, requiring a reciprocal exemption system. It also may 
make the residents of the other treaty country more cost-conscious with respect to 
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foreign taxes since they no longer enjoy a 100% marginal reimbursement rate in 
the form of foreign tax credits, thus harming the source countries ability to tax.188 
Overall, it is puzzling that tax treaties do not take into account differences 
in investment flows, disparities in tax systems, and various ways in which the model 
treaty may diverge from the national interest. Despite the enormous economic and 
legal changes that have developed since the model tax treaties were first developed, 
far from becoming more heterogeneous, tax treaties seem to be converging.189 
Moreover, despite the fact that Elisabeth Owens called for formal analysis of the 
costs and benefits of tax treaties nearly sixty years ago, there has been virtually no 
progress on that front.190 I explore possible reasons for these phenomena below.191 
B. Stagnation of Domestic Policy and International Tax Norms 
Another problematic effect of tax treaties is the stagnation of domestic 
policy and international tax norms. Over two decades ago, John Avery Jones cited 
the proliferation of treaties as problematically locking in both domestic and treaty 
policy.192 Tax treaties cannot be easily changed because they are so numerous.193 
And, unless countries are willing and able to override tax treaties, domestic policy 
is stymied.194 The problem has only worsened since Avery Jones raised the issue, 
with the number of treaties having more than doubled since then.  
Of course, stagnation may not be a problem if the treaty regime locks in 
beneficial policy. Although tax treaties may have initially served some valid 
purposes, they, however, more recently have contributed to the breakdown of the 
international tax system. As discussed above, instead of easing double taxation, 
treaties have contributed to double non-taxation.195 This problem has grown 
exponentially with the rise of digital technology and immensely valuable (and 
easily shifted) intellectual property. Moreover, their requirements have increasingly 
come into conflict with possible solutions to the problems plaguing the 
international tax system. Recent U.S. tax reform has brought this problem into the 
spotlight.  
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1. The Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax and Potential Treaty Conflicts 
In 2016, Republicans began to set forth their platform to overhaul the 
international tax provisions. Their initial plan was to replace the corporate income 
tax with a destination-based cash flow tax (“DBCFT”). The DBCFT would have 
essentially been a modified VAT, with a deduction for wages.196 Like a VAT, the 
tax would also have been border-adjusted, meaning that it excludes exports and 
taxes imports without deduction for costs.197  Its features meant that the DBCFT 
would have treated debt and equity equally, removed taxes on investment returns, 
and removed incentives to profit shift and offshore activities.198 Taxing on a 
destination basis (where sales occur) offers advantages relative to taxing on an 
origin basis (where value is created). In general, the residency of customers is more 
fixed than that of corporations, and thus taxing a business on this basis likely 
reduces tax avoidance. Additionally, ascertaining where products or services are 
invented is an economic fiction that has proven impossible to execute, leading to 
the shifting of profits through transfer pricing games.  
There are reasons to think that a destination-based approach should at least 
supplement revenue collection given the rise of the multinational corporation. 
However, the plan was critiqued, in part, for its incompatibility with the tax treaty 
regime if the DBCFT was considered a “covered tax” under the treaties.199 If so, 
the treaties’ permanent establishment requirement, which essentially requires a 
physical presence in the source country before that country can exercise taxing 
jurisdiction over business profits, would forbid the imposition of a destination-
based tax that taxes where goods are sold. In short, the very feature that makes the 
DBCFT attractive is the same trait that makes it incompatible with the treaties—
taxing at destination versus origin. 
In addition to the conflict with the permanent establishment limitation, the 
DBCFT also implicated other treaty provisions. In order to include all imports, the 
DBCFT should be levied on intangibles that produce royalties and other types of 
deductible payments that can substitute for royalties since their exclusion would 
invite tax abuse. If the DBCFT is considered an income tax, however, then such 
inclusion would constitute a treaty override because it would violate the treaty 
provisions that forbid withholding on such payments.200 The DCBFT also might 
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arguably violate the nondiscrimination provision of the treaties by advantaging 
exporters over importers.201 Furthermore, if the DBCFT is not an income tax and 
therefore outside the treaty’s scope, treaty partners would be under no obligation to 
provide foreign tax credits to their residents who pay the tax.202  
A further issue results from the fact that U.S. corporations may no longer 
be U.S. residents under the treaty because, under the DBCFT, they would no longer 
be “liable to tax . . . by reason of  . . . domicile, residence, citizenship, place of 
management, place of incorporation, or any other criterion of a similar nature.”203 
Accordingly, foreign taxpayers may no longer benefit from the treaty provision that 
reduces withholding on dividends, among other complications.204 
Another challenge is that if the United States were to enact the DBCFT, 
then its treaty partners may no longer have incentives to maintain or renegotiate 
treaties.205 This is because the United States would be giving up its jurisdiction to 
tax income as the residence country; therefore, why should a source country provide 
relief from its withholding tax? On the other hand, if the United States was no 
longer taxing worldwide income, the source country’s reduction of withholding tax 
would flow to the investor rather than the United States Treasury, therefore perhaps 
strengthening the source country’s ability to attract investment.206 The source 
country may also feel increased pressure to reduce its taxation of direct investment 
income considering the favorable tax treatment U.S. investment would receive.207 
Another concern would be the potential for tax arbitrage between the 
DBCFT, which would not tax income, and a treaty partner’s income tax system that 
allows for interest deductions.208 This arbitrage opportunity may induce treaty 
partners to terminate their treaties in order to impose higher withholding taxes on 
interest and dividends to U.S. residents.209 Congress may attempt to stave off such 
terminations by imposing its own withholding tax on interest and dividends to non-
residents, but this may itself violate the nondiscrimination provision since the 
United States may not be taxing investment income of its own residents.210 Even if 
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the provision was upheld, the United States may wish to condition any treaty 
exemptions of the new discriminatory tax on reciprocal exemption from the treaty 
partner, a perhaps undesirable bargain for a country with reciprocal trade flows with 
the United States and a large tax base.211 
In short, the enactment of the DBCFT would cause chaos in the international 
tax community. The myriad issues presented by the tax have caused some to predict 
that its enactment could lead to the collapse of the treaty regime.212 Moreover, this 
problem is not specific to the DBCFT. Other significant new taxes in other 
countries pose classification challenges for tax treaties. In the past few years, The 
Indian Equalization Levy, the UK Diverted Profits Tax, the Australian Diverted 
Profits Tax, the Netherlands Excessive Severance Tax, and the Belgian Fairness 
Tax—are all hybrid taxes of some nature and serious questions have arisen over 
their relationship with the treaty system.213 Together, these taxes and the U.S. 
reforms, discussed below, are part of a larger debate over taxing on a destination 
basis versus an origin basis.214  
More recently, the European Commission has proposed levying a turnover 
tax on the digital revenues, which would almost exclusively hit U.S. technology 
companies. The EU Council Legal Service issued an opinion that the digital 
services tax is not an indirect tax,215 which also makes it harder to contend that tax 
treaties are not in conflict with it since tax treaties demand certain requirements of 
direct taxes. The digital services tax is fundamentally flawed because it focuses 
only on digital companies, but it is also likely to suffer from design problems 
because its proponents have attempted to enact it within the treaty-based context of 
a permanent establishment, stretching this concept to the point of disbelief.216 
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Justifying the tax by using the notoriously vague concept of value creation will set 
no reliable architecture for the new tax.217  
We might search for a procedural solution to all of this. If the DBCFT 
presents difficulties of treaty interpretation, and was clearly not contemplated in the 
treaty’s design, then the states should endeavor to resolve the issue by mutual 
agreement. Going forward, a clause could be inserted in Article 2 of the treaties to 
cover significant new taxes if the parties reach a mutual agreement to this effect. 
The hybrid nature of these taxes requires further clarification from the treaty 
partners, and asking courts and arbitrators to fill these significant gaps may be 
beyond their institutional capacity. Yet even if an administrative solution was 
achievable, the complexities resulting from the mapping of these taxes onto the 
treaty system expose the latter’s rigidity. International movement towards 
destination-based taxes or increased taxation at source is preferable, but this is 
antithetical to the fundamental deal cut in tax treaties. As a result, the substance of 
the proposals have suffered, and the treaty regime makes the likelihood of such a 
shift more remote.  
2. The BEAT  
a. Potential Treaty Conflicts 
Although Republicans abandoned the DBCFT, the 2017 tax legislation that 
was enacted also poses significant challenges to the tax treaty system. Among the 
changes to the tax law is the new inbound base erosion regime, which is designed 
to prevent earnings stripping from companies that have been able to erode the base 
by making deductible payments to related foreign parties.  
The originally proposed inbound regime was the House excise tax.218 The 
excise tax subjected income from deductible items, including royalties and cost of 
goods sold, to an excise tax, which was designed to prompt taxpayers to elect to 
treat such payments as effectively connected income. The Ways and Means 
committee report made clear that the new tax was necessary to supplement transfer 
pricing principles, which were not sufficient to stop inbound base erosion.219  
There is a strong argument that the proposed House excise tax would have 
breached treaty obligations because the tax was designed to hit multinationals 
without a permanent establishment, in violation of Article 7 of the treaty.220 The 
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excise tax also was vulnerable to the criticism that it was an indirect way to impose 
withholding taxes on royalties, contrary to Article 12 of the treaties. Additionally, 
the tax also arguably violated the arm’s length standard of Article 9 of the treaties 
because it would have applied to cost of goods sold between the related parties 
regardless of what parties dealing at arm’s length would have agreed to do.  
The end result of the excise tax would have also been to tax foreign-earned 
income, with no foreign tax credit or double tax relief. Such criticism forced the 
House to revise the proposal to allow a partial foreign tax credit. This was the case 
even though the United States would have been crediting residence country taxes 
as the source country, when traditionally foreign tax credits are offered by the 
residence country for source country taxes.221 This revision reduced the revenue 
estimate of the proposal.222 
In part because of its tension with the tax treaties, Congress abandoned the 
House excise tax, instead enacting the BEAT, a new and separate tax.223 The BEAT 
functions as an alternative minimum tax, adding back in certain deductible 
payments to foreign related parties (but not U.S. related parties) to constitute a 
“modified taxable income” base.224 The BEAT liability is the excess of 10% of that 
base over the taxpayer’s regular tax liability. Notably, although it functions similar 
to the now repealed corporate alternative minimum tax, the BEAT does not allow 
foreign tax credits in the calculation of the base.225  
Importantly, the BEAT also allows parties to circumvent it because it 
exempts cost of goods sold, including imbedded royalties.226 In contrast, the House 
excise tax would have left less room for circumvention because it would have 
applied to cost of goods sold. Unfortunately, because the House tax applied to cost 
of goods sold, it likely would have violated the arms’ length principle of the treaties. 
The alternative minimum tax structure of the BEAT is an attempt to 
accommodate tax treaties, but a group of EU Ministers asserted that the BEAT 
regime could be viewed as discriminating against foreign companies in violation of 
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bilateral tax treaties.227 Article 24(5) of our double tax treaties provides that treaty 
partners cannot tax residents of the other treaty country more heavily than its own 
residents.228 Arguably, the BEAT violates this nondiscrimination clause because a 
foreign-owned U.S. entity will be subject to the BEAT regime whereas a U.S.-
owned U.S. entity will not be. One counter-argument is that the BEAT applies 
regardless of who ultimately owns the corporation.229 Thus, the BEAT applies to 
payments from a U.S. entity to a foreign entity that is owned by the U.S. entity (a 
CFC), which indicates that the intent was to protect the U.S. tax base rather than to 
discriminate against foreign-owned U.S. parties.230    
Another arguable path to treaty violation is Article 24(4), which commands 
that foreign residents be entitled to deductions “under the same conditions” as U.S. 
residents.231 The BEAT regime, however, is arguably not equivalent to the denial 
of a deduction, and interest, royalties, and other items remain fully deductible. 
Instead, the BEAT merely subjects the tax benefit conferred by such deductions to 
the 10% tax; denying a tax deduction would increase the tax on the item by 21%, 
not 10%.232 Additionally, the base erosion rules are perhaps sanctioned under 
Article 24(4) because they are necessary to arrive at an appropriate arm’s length 
result within the meaning of Article 9 of the treaties, although this argument seems 
less forceful since the BEAT applies even when arm’s length prices are charged.233 
The BEAT may also violate Article 23, which requires treaty partners to 
grant a foreign tax credit for income tax of the treaty partner “in accordance with 
the provisions and subject to the limitations of the law of the United States (as it 
may be amended from time to time without changing the general principle 
hereof.”234 Since the BEAT offers no foreign tax credit, it may be inconsistent with 
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the “general principle” of Article 23.235 It is possible, however, that the BEAT is 
not a “covered tax” under Article 2 of the treaty and therefore not subject to the 
requirements of Article 23 (although still subject to Article 24).236 If the BEAT did 
not fall within this category of “covered taxes,” then a treaty partner could not 
object to the disallowance of foreign tax credits.  
As discussed above, what constitutes a covered tax is a difficult question, 
and the status of many new taxes is in doubt.237 Relevant to the BEAT context, 
however, is that the United States has previously taken the position that the AMT 
was covered by the treaties and the two taxes are structurally similar.238 Another 
counter to the argument that the BEAT falls outside the treaties’ scope is that 
Congress chose to enact it as part of subtitle A (“Income Taxes”) of the Code.239 In 
favor of BEAT’s non-coverage, however, is the fact that it denies deductions for 
payments to related foreign persons, therefore falling outside the definition of an 
“income” tax.240  
 
b. Overrides and Implications of Treaty Conflicts 
If the BEAT is a covered tax, then should it not simply constitute a treaty 
override? There is current scholarly debate over how easily Congress can override 
treaties, which has implications for the issue of whether treaties stymie domestic 
reform. If Congress can readily override treaties, then perhaps we need not worry. 
If it cannot, then perhaps the concern is more justified. 
As mentioned above, under the U.S. Constitution, treaties and statutes are 
both “supreme law” and, as discussed above, the Court has held that, when there is 
a conflict between the two, the one enacted “later in time” will prevail.241 David 
Rosenbloom and Fadi Shaheen argue that a Supreme Court case, Cook v. United 
States, stands for the proposition that Congress must clearly express treaty 
overrides, otherwise “a treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or 
modified by a later statute.”242 This is surely correct as a restatement of the 
reasoning of Cook, but Cook should be read as a rule of statutory interpretation, 
only applicable if there is a question as to how the statute should be constructed. 
The Court itself cabined its reasoning as to resolving “any doubt as to the 
construction of the statute.” In essence, the Cook doctrine can be seen as a variation 
on the Charming Betsy canon, which is used to construe statutes as to avoid treaty 
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Moreover, the Cook Court was also applying the doctrine in a rather narrow 
set of circumstances—interpreting the reenactment of a statute that preceded a later 
enacted treaty. The reenactment was identical to the statute that was later 
superseded by the treaty, and the Court held that the later in time rule privileged the 
treaty. In this unusual set of facts, it can be inferred that Congress’s intent was to 
not abrogate the treaty. In other words, the circumstances produced clear expression 
of Congress’s intent. This should not foreclose other ways in which Congress can 
clearly express its intent to override.  
One such way for Congress to do so is through enactment of a statute that 
clearly conflicts with a prior treaty. In the instant case, the BEAT plainly does not 
provide a foreign tax credit. Courts should not rewrite the statute to avoid a treaty 
conflict. Nor should the statute be rewritten to calculate the modified taxable 
income base to allow deductions for otherwise deductible payments to related 
persons resident in treaty countries, when this is explicitly forbidden by the statute. 
Yes, courts are reluctant to find treaty and statutory conflicts, but they do not 
rewrite statutes to accommodate treaties.244  
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There may be additional arguments for why we should privilege statutes 
above treaties when enacted later in time in the tax context specifically. Sections 
894(a) and 7852(d) of the Code reiterate that treaties and statutes are on equal 
footing.245 The legislative history of these sections indicates that Congress wished 
to codify the last in time rule for tax provisions246 and specifically rejected the IRS’s 
position that, under Cook, a statute must explicitly override a treaty in order for it 
to take precedence.247  
I have also previously argued that tax treaties are likely in tension with the 
Origination Clause, which requires all revenue legislation to originate in the House, 
because, as self-executing Article II treaties, they omit the House from the treaty 
process.248 To quell the House’s ability to override treaties, by requiring clear 
expression of intent for instance, would lay in further tension with the Origination 
Clause since overrides are one way the House traditionally protects its 
constitutional prerogative.249 Although the availability of congressional overrides 
does not cure the constitutional defect, it does allow the House to participate at least 
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somewhat to formulate revenue policy in an area from which it is otherwise 
omitted. 
Finally, there is some historical precedent for allowing treaty overrides 
without clear statements in the tax context. Since the enactment of section 7852(d) 
in 1988 and prior to the enactment of the 2017 tax bill, there have been at least three 
instances in which Congress has enacted statutes that conflict with the treaties while 
being silent on the issue in both the statutory text and legislative history. In 2004, 
Congress enacted an excise tax on nonresident alien “insiders” of an expatriating 
U.S. corporation. In 2008, Congress imposed a transfer tax on gifts or bequests 
from an expatriate. In 2010, Congress enacted the net investment income tax, which 
can apply to foreign source income without foreign tax credit allowances.250 In 
none of these cases have courts mandated that the statutes be rewritten to 
accommodate the treaties.251 
Should we then conclude that Congress has an easy time overriding treaties 
and therefore our concerns about stymying tax reform are unfounded? Certainly 
under Rosenbloom and Shaheen’s view, the concern that tax treaties impede tax 
reform is more acute since Congress has to affirmatively state their intention to 
violate international law, which, shall we say, could be awkward. But we have 
reason to worry about Congress’s agency over domestic reform even if we reject 
Rosenbloom and Shaheen’s reading of the caselaw.  
International law, not U.S. law, determines whether or not international 
obligations continue; obligations under international law may continue in the face 
of a congressional override of the treaty. Congress will be reluctant to put the 
United States in breach of its obligations.252 This is likely a reason why overrides 
of tax treaties occur predominantly in the tax treaty abuse context, where they are 
more justifiable.253  
There is also reason to indicate that Congress may be less willing to override 
treaties going forward. It used to be the case that after the treaty overrides of the 
80s and 90s, Congress was able to renegotiate the existing tax treaties in order to 
accommodate the statutory changes. Recently, however, the Senate has been unable 
to move treaties through the Article II process, and many have been languishing for 
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years.254 The possibility of renegotiation thus is much more remote in the current 
era than in prior eras of treaty overrides. This may have a chilling effect on the 
amount of treaty overrides Congress is willing to do, and thus the concern for policy 
stasis is likely to be even greater than before.  
Indeed, many legislative proposals are abandoned or narrowed out of 
concern for treaty conflicts, as this discussion has demonstrated. In part out of 
concern for incompatibility with international obligations, Congress enacted the 
less ambitious BEAT, rather than the House’s excise tax. Arguably, the inbound 
tax regime would have been more ambitious in scope, and hence more effective, if 
this had not been the case.  
 To conclude, tax treaties, especially in recent years, impede domestic 
reform. Although Congress may, at times be willing to override the treaties, it likely 
does so much less often than if such an act were authorized by international law 
and blessed by our treaty partners. This is a risk inherent to all treaties, to an extent, 
but is particularly problematic in the tax treaty context, the foundations of which 
have not been modernized to take into account developments such as the rise of the 
multinational corporation and electronic commerce. The tax treaty network rests on 
a foundation of arbitrary and conflicting rules that distort economic activity and 
spawn tax competition. It also has served to keep that foundation in place, long past 
its shelf life. International movement toward destination-based taxes, greater source 
taxation, or even formulary apportionment, would be preferable, but the treaty 
regime makes the likelihood of such a shift more remote. Although the 
constitutional structure in the United States allows some relief from this danger, it 
by no means solves the fundamental problem.  
 
c. The Danger of Rate Stasis  
In addition to impeding structural tax reform, treaties also obstruct domestic 
policy other ways. Perhaps the most visible feature of tax treaties is the ceiling they 
impose on withholding rates. An underappreciated consequence of this ceiling is 
that, unless the United States wishes to tax such income at rates below those set 
forth by the treaty, domestic rates on outbound income are effectively fixed. The 
rate ceiling thus hamstrings domestic policy such that the government cannot be as 
reactive to macroeconomic conditions, fiscal crises, or other factors. This presents 
troubling effects on efficiency and limits the ability to deploy countercyclical 
responses.255  
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C. Tax Abuse Opportunities 
A third disadvantage of tax treaties is that they encourage tax avoidance as 
a result of the ceding of taxing jurisdiction and the interface between the treaties 
and domestic provisions.256 Since this was discussed in the context of whether tax 
treaties fulfill their promise of achieving double non-taxation, I will not discuss it 
here. But it is a significant downside and one that costs revenue.   
 
IV. WHY DOES U.S. TREATY POLICY REMAIN IN THE PAST? 
A. Process Deficiencies and Political Economy 
If tax treaties have these negative effects and also fail to fulfill their 
purposes, why has U.S. tax treaty policy remained stagnant for decades? For one, 
tax treaties suffer from a deficiency in process. Because tax treaties are Article II 
treaties, the House is entirely cut out of the tax treaty process despite its long 
constitutional pedigree as the initiator of tax policy on the domestic side.257 
Somewhat puzzlingly, this stands in contrast to trade treaties, with which the House 
has remained involved through congressional executive agreements. The House’s 
participation in the trade treaty context has been justified, in part, because of its 
traditional role over revenues, as set forth in the Origination Clause.258  
The treaty process often flies under the radar. Most of the treaty negotiating 
process happens behind closed doors, with multinational corporations strategically 
communicating their policy positions to negotiators.259 It is not surprising that the 
paucity in process benefits special interests like these corporations.  Each step in 
the legislative process can potentially derail any proposal. The more robust process 
means the greater potential for policy failure. When the context is bestowing 
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benefits to special interests (as opposed to the public), a less robust process will 
accrue to their benefit.260 Tax treaties reduce the tax bills of multinational 
corporations and do not increase taxes. Therefore, their relatively easy path to 
enactment favors such constituents at the expense of the public. Additionally, the 
resultant lobbying power of the corporations helps to explain why tax treaties exist 
in their current form—to benefit industry. The lack of process generally benefits 
policy that would otherwise be controversial in the legislative process. 
Thus, a nefarious explanation for why tax treaties look the way they do is 
that they are simply a less visible way to funnel U.S. revenues to multinational 
corporations. Seen as tax incentives that do not have the scrutiny of the legislative 
or budget processes, they are invisible and against the public interest.261 Perhaps 
then it is not so puzzling that the United States would remain in treaties that are 
antithetical to its interest—to be able to deliver benefits to powerful constituencies 
without some kind of reckoning.  
Groups that might normally be opposed to funneling benefits to 
multinational corporations, such as labor unions, are absent from the tax treaty 
process, in spite of their engagement over the reach of our international tax system 
as implemented through domestic law.262 Domestic policy disfavoring outbound 
investment is in direct conflict with the lowering of withholding rates through the 
treaty, yet public debate only focuses on the former. These advocacy groups may 
overlook tax treaties because the process forecloses open and vigorous deliberation. 
In fact, their significant participation in trade treaties suggest this might be the case 
since such treaties, as congressional-executive agreements, are subject to greater 
process than tax treaties.263  
The other major deficiency in process is the lack of revenue estimates of tax 
treaties, or any studies undertaken by Treasury that might justify entrance into 
particular tax treaties.264 The lack of consensus on whether tax treaties increase 
foreign direct investment and the reversal of trade flows that the United States has 
experienced over the past few decades, which almost certainly impacts the revenue 
picture of the treaties, makes the omission from the budget process especially 
troubling.265 
Not only are there no revenue estimates when the United States enters into 
treaties, the benefits they funnel to taxpayers also do not show up on the tax 
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expenditure budget, 266 which the JCT publishes to account for revenue losses from 
special tax benefits. Many decades ago, Stanley Surrey famously concluded that 
such preferences should be highlighted as equivalent to government spending since 
they constituted revenue losses.267 Among such preferences Surrey highlighted 
were certain tax benefits provided by tax treaties.268 The absence of tax treaties 
from the tax expenditure budget allows for an easier path to treaty conclusion.269  
One might try to justify omission of tax treaties from the tax expenditure 
budget as reflecting difficulties in defining the appropriate baseline. Surrey and 
McDaniel argued, for instance, that reduction in gross withholding taxes are not tax 
expenditures because they reflect an approximation of the tax burden if it were 
applied on a net basis.270 Of course, if the rate was very low or zero, as is the case 
for certain types of income under the treaties, then such justification for omission 
from the budget would not be applicable. Another justification for omission might 
be that the exercise would prove too challenging for the estimators.271 Presumably, 
however, JCT could attempt to produce some average tax rates applicable to net 
investment income on the domestic front and use this as an approximate baseline.  
Moreover, this line of argument does not extend to the regular budget 
process. In estimating revenues for purposes of the enactment process (if such 
revenue estimates were produced), the proper baseline is not a normative one but 
generally follows current law with some prescribed modifications.272 In that 
context, the proper revenue baseline should be the 30% withholding rate applicable 
to net investment income earned by non-U.S. residents. 
The paucity in process might also have several other ramifications. As 
discussed above, treaties do not seem to fulfill their stated or unstated purposes. 
Enhanced deliberation might help clarify the objectives of tax treaties, or expose 
the lack thereof.273 Additionally, the process problem might also help explain why 
tax treaties are surprisingly uniform in nature, a suboptimal result given the 
variances in relative trading positions of the U.S. and its tax treaty partners.274 More 
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robust process might help to create heterogeneity among the treaties, tailoring them 
to various national interests.  
Finally, although powerful constituencies shape U.S. treaty policy as a 
matter of political economy, there is reason to be hopeful that there is some room 
for reform of the process. Although tax treaties have historically been approved as 
a matter of course, the politically charged environment has made this less likely.275 
Although opponents of tax treaties have blocked them for reasons unrelated to the 
problems discussed here, perhaps this controversy will shift the burden to 
proponents to analyze and justify their costs.    
B. The Lock-In Effect 
Another obstacle to treaty innovation is the fact that the international tax 
system is comprised of thousands of bilateral treaties. Any changes must generally 
be made treaty-by-treaty, and, as discussed above, the proliferation of the treaties 
has created a “network effect” whereby deviation from the script is disapproved in 
the global community.276 Tax treaties are based on a common standard that 
provides more and more benefits the greater the number of adopters.277 The OECD 
treaties have positive network externalities along the dimensions of predictability 
of legal content, enforcement, and the signaling of a credible commitment to a 
stable regime.278  But as the network grows, so do its costs.  
First, the initiators can exploit the network to extract “cartelistic gains from 
potential competitors and monopolistic rents from its own users.” Second, there is 
a strong lock-in effect; the treaty remains in force even when the standard becomes 
undesirable because it becomes difficult for users to establish a new network. This 
is because any purveyors of a new standard will have a difficult time recruiting 
other states to join the new network without a critical mass that can reduce risk and 
transition costs.279 At one time, the United States, and other developed nations, may 
have rationally preferred the treaties’ tilt towards the residence country when they 
were capital-exporting, but they are now locked into that position long after it no 
longer makes sense. As a result, the status quo reigns.  
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C. Race to the Bottom 
Nations may also enter into tax treaties with countries in which trade flows 
are obviously and persistently asymmetrical in order to receive legitimacy on the 
international level, although this is unlikely to be the case with established countries 
like the United States. They may hope to increase foreign direct investment through 
the reduction in tax burden, although, as discussed above, the evidence on this is 
mixed.280 A more nefarious explanation could simply be the exploitation of 
politically “weak” countries by “strong” ones. Countries could be engaging in a 
race to the bottom, whereby one country chooses the sub-optimal option of joining 
the treaty network because it fears others will do so as well, thereby crowding it out 
of the investment environment.  
In particular, source countries may assent to the regime in spite of its 
favoring residence countries because of a prisoner’s dilemma scenario.281 If all 
source countries are competing to attract foreign direct investment, they could be 
in a better position to agree to not sign treaties and maintain their revenues. 
Anticipating defection, however, a source country may choose to enter into a treaty 
because they may be better off if the other source country does not sign the treaty, 
although still worse off than in a world where the source countries all agreed not to 
participate in the treaty regime. They also will be better off than if they are the fool 
who did not sign the treaty when the other one did. We could model this dilemma 
as follows, with the order of preferences per country noted numerically from 1 (the 
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Under this scenario, the countries are worse off if all join since there is a 
perhaps only a modest possibility of increasing investment but with fewer revenues. 
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Yet, this is the likely outcome given that a worse outcome would be if one country 
joins the treaty network and the other one is left out. Coordination problems, thus 
may explain why countries with divergent interests enter into tax treaties.282  
Finally, the world is changing, and developing countries do not seem as 
eager to sign double tax treaties as they once were.283 As I mentioned above, even 
developed countries have started to contemplate self-help regimes around the 
treaties.284 Thus, just because tax treaties have evolved as the building blocks of the 
international tax regime does not mean they will continue to serve that function. 
V. UNRAVELING THE TAX TREATY 
 
In light of the foregoing discussion, how might we reconceptualize the tax 
treaty? The world seems to be moving away from the prioritization of residence 
country taxation. The recent U.S. international reform and proposed and enacted 
taxes in Europe can be seen as strengthening taxation by the “source” country.285 
Furthermore, the double tax treaties have recently been under attack by developing 
countries, who now question whether it is in their interest to sign them. The pressure 
that globalization, stateless income, and technology have placed on the antiquated 
international tax system may cause other countries also to doubt the relevance of 
tax treaties. As a result, the bargains long reached in the tax treaties may very well 
be finally upended.  
This is because the international tax system, based on antiquated and 
artificial source rules, is fundamentally at odds with the nature of today’s world 
economy. Geopolitical, technological, and economic forces, as well as the 
phenomenon of stateless income, will require policy innovation that is likely to be 
in tension with the bargains reached long ago in tax treaties. The allocation of taxing 
rights no longer makes sense for many countries, both developed and developing, 
but instead serves a small but powerful constituency—the multinational 
corporation. The new international tax system will likely place more emphasis on 
source-based taxation, as a response to the fact that residence country taxation has 
diminished, and contain more destination-based rules, as a response to the ability 
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of multinational corporations to more easily game origin-based rules. So far, tax 
treaties have served to thwart such innovation, but the desperate need for revenues 
may eventually require it.  
Thus, it seems that the tax treaty provisions that allocate taxing jurisdiction 
should be jettisoned. Yet some of the treaty provisions that do not relate to the 
allocation of income should be retained, or at least could be kept with little cost. 
For instance, any shift to destination-based taxation is likely to be incremental. As 
a result, the rules regarding transfer price enforcement will likely be useful in the 
interim. The information exchange provisions are less useful with the rise of other 
international agreements in the area and should yield to those. Their retention does 
little harm, however, unlike the allocation of income provisions. Nondiscrimination 
may be more appropriately dealt with by trade treaties, as discussed above, but this 
may be asking too much of a system that is currently also in a state of upheaval. 
Moreover, given the flexible interpretation U.S. courts have given 
nondiscrimination, it may not provide as many obstacles to fundamental reform as 
the jurisdictional provisions do. 
As discussed above, the OECD has completed a multinational instrument 
that aims to create a streamlined mechanism by which countries can amend their 
existing tax treaties to include BEPS measures, subject to domestic ratification 
procedures.286 The aim is to allow countries to update their treaties without the need 
for treaty-by-treaty negotiating. This effort is, in some ways, not as ambitious as it 
first appears. It primarily relates to proposals, like the limitation on benefits and 
mandatory arbitration provisions, that can be found in existing treaties entered into 
by the United States. In general, the BEPS process leaves in place treaty rules 
dividing the tax base between the two countries and does little to update those 
concepts. Treaties are also only amended if there is a two-sided “match” between 
treaty partners in choosing which of the new provisions to adopt. Still, one could 
imagine that the multilateral instrument may eventually extend beyond the BEPS 
project, inducing the United States to sign on to it.287  
Somewhat paradoxically, the multilateral instrument, which was designed 
to breathe new life into the double tax treaty regime, could be used to scale it down. 
Additionally, although many nations and experts have opposed a multilateral 
regime for encroaching upon national sovereignty, the new instrument could be 
leveraged to restore sovereignty over tax policy.  
Specifically, the multilateral instrument could be used to opt out of those 
aspects of the tax treaties that reallocate taxing jurisdiction while maintaining the 
still useful features such as dispute resolution mechanisms and nondiscrimination 
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provisions. This would allow countries to examine where it is in their interest to 
give up source-based taxation and where it is not. Essentially, rather than countries 
signing on to a system of treaties that are identical to one another, the multilateral 
instrument could be used to tailor treaties to the particular needs of a set of 
countries, creating a heterogeneous international tax system.288  
This new heterogeneity of the tax treaties, although disruptive in many 
respects, could more fairly reflect the incongruity of trade flows between countries, 
differences in the elasticities of taxing foreign income between nations, variances 
in revenue needs, and divergence in gains from comity and reputation. Although 
this diversification could occur unilaterally, the multilateral instrument provides a 
mechanism to do so without jettisoning the treaty framework altogether or taking 
the controversial move of treaty termination. It would also obviate the need for 
painstaking treaty-by-treaty negotiation. Moreover, it provides a mechanism to 
automatically update treaties as the circumstances of a nation changes. 
Leveraging the multilateral instrument would also allow for intermediate 
options that a nation could opt into. Instead of abandoning the low treaty rates on 
withholding, for instance, they could be raised somewhat in between the current 
treaty rates and the statutory rates. Nations could even specify a range that they 
would tolerate, and if the treaty partner’s range also matches, then the treaty rates 
could be adjusted to the mid-point of overlap.  
Another more moderate option would be to expand upon the permanent 
establishment concept, allowing for taxation at source without necessarily a 
physical presence. Although this proposal was rejected in the BEPS effort, it should 
be revisited. Political interest in digital taxes has increased since then, and an 
expanded notion of permanent establishment would accommodate these and more 
destination-based approaches to taxation. Reforming the concept of permanent 
establishment could also make source country jurisdiction contingent upon 
administrative capacity of the source country.289 Since a country without the ability 
to collect source country taxes is arguably not losing anything from residence 
country taxation, treaty partners may decide this is an efficient allocation of taxing 
jurisdiction.  
An important aspect of this approach is flexibility. Currently, the 
multilateral instrument goes a long way in this regard by allowing countries to opt 
in and out of proposals. Even the minimum standards, which signatories to the 
instrument are required to meet, can be fulfilled in a variety of manners. Since the 
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multilateral instrument allows nations to pick and choose which treaties are subject 
to which new provisions, this would allow countries with asymmetric trade flows 
or different tax systems to opt out of the tax allocation provisions when it is not in 
their interest. Given the fact that, under asymmetric trade flows, one capital-
exporting country will likely benefit from residence-based taxation and the other 
capital-importing country will lose, it is likely that unilateral rejection of these 
provisions will be controversial. Once the other country sees that withdrawal is 
imminent, however, it is likely in their interests to acquiesce to the unilateral 
withdrawal rather than risk the termination of the entire treaty. The countries may 
also decide to come to an agreement to scale up source-based taxation. Moreover, 
the multilateral instrument could provide a means to revisit the treaties if a 
country’s economic circumstances changed.  
Rather than the 3000 tax treaties that are nearly identical to one another, we 
could have a system of bilateral tax treaties that better reflect national interests. 
Moreover, by deemphasizing residence-based jurisdiction, this type of system may 
assist in helping to solve the stateless income problem. Finally, because the pared 
down treaty system would necessarily give way to more domestic solutions, 
international tax could respond more readily to current economic conditions and 
tax planning maneuvers. Although some might critique this solution as causing 
chaos in the international tax sphere, I would argue that we are at least on the 
precipice of that point already, and an ordered unwinding of the system is preferable 
to unilateral moves by individual nations that we are beginning to see.  
Another advantage of this proposal is that it would give nations the space 
and flexibility to experiment with new ways to tax cross-border income. As 
countries have struggled with various methods of taxing stateless income it has 
become apparent that fitting such new taxes into the old tax treaty model is a fool’s 
errand. Moreover, the time to explore novel approaches to cross-border taxation is 
now, as the E.U. state aid controversy and other developments have suddenly cast 
doubt upon the longstanding status quo of preventing double taxation as the sole 
focus of the international tax system.290 
If tax treaties are at least partially unraveled, we might ask how and when 
the new system should be rebuilt. It is my view that even if true multilateral 
coordination of the tax base is not achieved, abandonment of or scaling down 
aspects of the current bilateral system is still worthwhile given their harmful effects. 
Ideally, however, a new system could be put into place as the older treaties are 
being unraveled. The first best solution would be to for nations to come together to 
decide on new principles that can accommodate destination-based taxation. Such 
principles must extend beyond the EU’s current sectorial focus of digital taxation 
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and the geographic focus on large U.S. corporations. Multilateral solutions should 
also strengthen source-based taxation in instances where the residence country is 
not taxing the income. To the extent an initial allocation of taxing jurisdiction is 
retained, the multilateral instrument could, for instance, pursue provisions that 
“throw-back” the tax to a state if the state of initial apportionment does not tax the 
item.291  
More modestly, the multilateral instrument could be used to resolve 
problems of inconsistent tax treatment. For instance, countries could agree to 
harmonize their tax rules in certain areas or to make adjustments to their domestic 
rules in order to achieve consistent tax treatment. 292 It could also be used to refine 
source rules to incorporate more destination-based concepts such as customer 
base.293 Domestic double-tax relief systems could then function in a better manner. 
Likewise, other problems of cross-border arbitrage could be addressed by the 
multilateral instrument.294  
If multilateral solutions are not found, domestic law could step in to serve 
as a coordination device. For instance, domestic law could impart some of the give 
and take in foreign relations by premising code provisions on reciprocity. This 
would allow nations to have more control over their revenue policy while also 
partially tying tax systems together. This would also address one potential objection 
to ceding more authority to individual nations—that control over international 
relations would be lost because nations would no longer have the quid pro quo 
negotiation that the treaty system imparts. 
It would also remove some of the arbitrariness in applying different policies 
to treaty and nontreaty countries, even if the economics or politics of the situation 
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call for uniform treatment between the two. A reciprocal code provision would 
instead tie foreign relations policy to the desired criteria. For instance, a code 
provision could re-allocate profits from a foreign related party to a domestic related 
party if the foreign profits were not subject to meaningful taxation abroad. This 
would be similar to the new kill-switch provisions in the 2016 U.S. Model treaty 
but would have the advantages that unilateral decision-making brings.295 After all, 
precisely those countries that are reluctant to tax such income may also be reluctant 
to implement these new treaty provisions. Other destination-based statutory 
solutions, like destination-based taxes or experimental source rules, could also be 
utilized to preserve taxation of business income.296 As these rules are enacted by a 
powerful country like the United States, other nations may follow suit, creating 
harmonization without multilateral action.   
Another significant advantage domestic law has over treaties is, at least in 
the United States, greater democratic process and transparency. With regard to 
statutory changes, both houses of Congress are involved, there is greater 
opportunity for deliberation, and any changes would be subject to the normal 
budget process.297 This has the advantage of bringing scrutiny over policies that 
benefit multinational corporations at perhaps great cost to the fisc. Although one 
can make the case that tax treaties allow countries to strategically enact different 
tax systems for foreign and domestic investors,298 such differentiation would still 
be attainable in, and would benefit from, a robust legislative process. Such a 
solution would also lend itself to greater policy innovation and fiscal flexibility. 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, this Article finds fault with the traditional justifications 
offered in favor of bilateral tax treaties. Most criticism towards these treaties has 
been done on behalf of developing nations, but countries like the United States also 
stands to lose from the status quo. Rather than accommodating tax reform or 
reflecting differences in tax systems or trade flows, the treaties, by and large, are 
entrenched and follow a single model.  In these respects, the most damaging aspects 
of the tax treaties are those provisions that allocate taxing jurisdiction. This Article 
suggests that countries should abandon or scale back these provisions and offers 
the new multilateral instrument as a possible means to do so. The hope is that this 
                                                 
295 See U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 20, at arts. 11(2)(c), 12(2)(a), and 21(2)(a). 
296 Such solutions need not wholly embrace destination-based taxation but could instead utilize 
some of its principles alongside the existing system. This incremental approach would allow for 
experimentation with a new form of taxation on a platform less risky than, say, the destination-
based cash flow tax that would have replaced the corporate income tax.  
297 See Kysar, supra note 2. 
298 See Zolt, supra note 185, at 14.  
60 
 
process paves the way toward a more dynamic and heterogenous tax treaty. Gone 
are the days where nations are able to invoke some notion of worldwide efficiency 
to justify a uniform international tax system. Instead, the system must do its best to 
coordinate within a world of competing national interests.   
